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Proceedings of the Annual Acquisition Research Program 
The following article is taken as an excerpt from the proceedings of the annual 
Acquisition Research Program.  This annual event showcases the research projects 
funded through the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.  Featuring keynote speakers, 
plenary panels, multiple panel sessions, a student research poster show and social 
events, the Annual Acquisition Research Symposium offers a candid environment 
where high-ranking Department of Defense (DoD) officials, industry officials, 
accomplished faculty and military students are encouraged to collaborate on finding 
applicable solutions to the challenges facing acquisition policies and processes within 
the DoD today.  By jointly and publicly questioning the norms of industry and academia, 
the resulting research benefits from myriad perspectives and collaborations which can 
identify better solutions and practices in acquisition, contract, financial, logistics and 
program management. 
For further information regarding the Acquisition Research Program, electronic 
copies of additional research, or to learn more about becoming a sponsor, please visit 
our program website at: 
www.acquistionresearch.org  
For further information on or to register for the next Acquisition Research 
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This study examines defense acquisition through the new lens of Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE). TCE is an emergent field in economics that has multiple applications to 
defense acquisition practices.  TCE’s original focus was to guide “make-or-buy?” decisions 
that define the boundaries of a firm. This study reviews insights afforded by TCE that impact 
government outsourcing (“buy” decisions), paying special attention to defense procurement. 
The study offers a brief synthesis and review of current Defense acquisition 
practices.  The Department of Defense (DoD) is a unique enterprise that relies heavily on 
outsourcing. Outsourcing transactions are governed using a wide variety of contracts that 
share risk between the government and the contractor.  Cost, schedule, and technical 
performance are widely accepted as success parameters in public and private transactions.  
While recently enacted defense acquisition practices address many of the issues raised by 
TCE, a key concept called “asset specificity” seems to have been overlooked. The “lock-in” 
effect achieved by contractors that invest in specific assets, while benefiting the government 
in the short run, can haunt the government in the long run. The risk is that, after winning a 
bidding competition, a contractor that invests in specific assets might eventually become a 
sole supplier that “holds up” the government, resulting in higher costs, schedule delays, or 
disappointing performance. We discuss some new and old solutions to the “holdup” 
problem. 
We conclude by offering a number of insights for defense acquisition program 
managers generated by the new perspective of TCE.  Whereas there is no universal 
template for the management and governance of complex and uncertain defense 
outsourcing relationships, TCE offers a valuable new perspective to improve the design and 
management of those relationships. 
SECTION 1:  INTRODUCTION 
This report offers insights for those involved in procurement and acquisition 
management from a relatively new field in Economics called Transaction Cost Economics 
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formulating acquisition strategy, and implications for acquisition management in the 
Department of Defense (DoD).  We then offer a synthesis of management practices in DoD, 
presenting examples of defense acquisitions and their associated governance strategies.  
We conclude with recommendations about how the application of fundamental principles of 
TCE might improve current defense acquisition management practices.     
A) Antecedents of the Project 
This paper is part of an ongoing effort to apply the insights of Transaction Cost 
Economics to DoD acquisition management practices (see Franck & Melese 2005).1  
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) is the study of the “vertical” boundaries of business 
enterprises—defined primarily by what goods and services are produced within the firm 
(“make”) and which are acquired from the market (“buy” or “outsource”).  TCE has a well-
established niche in economics as an academic discipline.  Among the pioneers of this 
literature are Nobel Prize winner Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson.  TCE is also a major 
feature in a movement called the “New Institutional Economics.”2  Unfortunately, these 
literatures focus almost exclusively on the private sector. More recent work by Pint and 
Baldwin (1997), Franck and Melese (2005), and others have begun to study TCE in a 
government setting—yielding some interesting insights. 
B) Early Insights from TCE 
The initial focus of the work by Franck and Melese (2005) was to examine the key 
document that guides all federal policy for the competition of commercial activities—Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76. For competitive sourcing competitions 
between a government activity and private sector suppliers, OMB A-76 calls for a one-time 
10% production cost advantage to justify outsourcing.  
Applying TCE suggests one size does not fit all. Outsourcing relationships vary 
widely in their characteristics and potential difficulties. A key insight is that increases in 
transaction costs (required to govern an outsourcing relationship) can more than offset any 
production cost advantages from outsourcing. Herein, the authors extend their observations 
to the acquisition of major weapon systems, which largely employ similar outsourcing 
relationships. 
The standard example is where ex-ante competitive bidding leads to an ex-post 
bilateral monopoly situation. The risk is that the winning supplier can lock-in the government 
                                                
1 Serious research into TCE at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) began in the late 1990s 
with Prof. Francois Melese’s inquiries into the relevant literature and applications to government. The 
intent of this research is to highlight TCE insights useful for public sector acquisition and, accordingly, 
to improve defense acquisition management practices.  Raymond Franck, also at NPS, joined this 
effort a few years later.  Products of this effort so far include several conference presentations, one 
student thesis (jointly advised by Melese and Franck), and one paper published in the proceedings of 
the Second Annual NPS Acquisition Research Symposium Proceedings in 2005. 
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by making investments in productive assets that are specific to the relationship (and that 
have little value outside the relationship). While initially advantageous, such investments in 
specific assets can make it prohibitively costly for other companies to compete in 
subsequent re-bidding of the contract. As a result, outsourcing relationships can involve 
extra transaction costs such as measurement, monitoring, and negotiation costs that can 
quickly overwhelm a simple 10% production cost advantage. 
The lesson is that transaction cost considerations need to be added to the current 
exclusive focus on production costs in OMB Circular A-76. This also suggests more 
attention be granted to: the proper bundling of goods and services; investing in a well-
defined Performance-Work Statement; clearly defining the terms of the contract—to include 
appropriate incentives; understanding the true costs of the transaction; and carefully 
designing mechanisms that will govern the outsourcing relationship. The next step is to 
extend these insights to DoD acquisition management practices.3  
C) Outline of the Report 
Section 2 of this report offers a summary and synthesis of the TCE literature.  It 
explores the issues of incentives built into contracts, hedged (or tapered) outsourcing, and 
issues of governance.  Section 3 presents a description of the principle components of 
defense acquisition transactions that are the most typical:  research & development and 
procurement of weapon systems, along with a summary and synthesis of associated 
practices in defense acquisition management—to include contract structure and governance 
of the relationship.  Finally, Section 4 offers a synthesis of these two bodies of knowledge. It 
considers similarities and differences in perspectives and explores possibilities for mutually 
beneficial sharing of concepts.  The section concludes with proposals based on applying 
TCE principles and insights to DoD acquisitions.   
SECTION 2:  REVIEW OF TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
Faced with ballooning budget deficits, growing entitlements, and an aging workforce, 
the federal government is searching for savings by outsourcing both positions and products. 
This presents senior defense officials with a dual challenge: First, what should the 
Department of Defense (DoD) make itself and what should it buy in the marketplace?4 
                                                
3 To do so requires collaboration with those having a practitioner’s expertise in this area. This 
occurred when our co-author John Dillard joined this research project. He is largely responsible for 
the comprehensive review of transaction components and current practices described in Section 3 of 
the study.  
4 In this study, the term “outsourcing” is used to encompass any situation that involves a government evaluation 
of whether to (continue to) produce a publicly provided good, service, or intermediate product or activity 
internally, or to purchase it from the private sector. An underlying assumption is that a decision has previously 
been made—presumably through a democratic process—for government to provide the good or service. The 
outsourcing evaluation determines whether the current government supplier, another government entity, or the 
private sector is best suited to produce it—or any necessary intermediate products or activities. The US Navy 
uses the term “strategic sourcing,” the US Air Force “competitive sourcing” (the British call it “market testing”). 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 spells out rules and procedures that govern outsourcing 
at the federal level.  In the context of this paper, “privatization” can be interpreted as the outcome of an 
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Second, if the decision is to buy (or outsource), how can we ensure better outcomes for 
taxpayers? 
A) The Make-or-buy Decision 
The field of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) offers an attractive theoretical 
foundation for business “make-or-buy?” decisions (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1971,1979; 
Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Klein et al.,1978). These make-or-buy decisions ultimately define 
the boundaries of a company. Although primarily focused on the private sector the TCE 
literature has occasionally been applied in a government setting (Pint & Baldwin, 1997; 
Weingast & Marshall, 1988; Williamson, 1999; Ferris & Graddy 1986, 1991, Franck & 
Melese, 2005).  
The dual objective of this section is to synthesize key principles and insights of TCE, 
and to apply those insights to support the “make-or-buy?” decisions of senior leadership in 
the Department of Defense (DoD). These make-or-buy decisions ultimately define DoD 
boundaries. In the course of this investigation, new tools will be revealed for Program 
Managers and others in the acquisition community to help govern contracting choices and to 
ensure better outcomes in terms of performance, cost and schedules.  
B) Production and Transaction Costs 
Coase (1937) was the first to ask why some profit maximizing firms produce goods 
and services themselves at higher production costs than can be purchased in the 
marketplace.5  The answer is that going to market entails “transaction costs,” and that these 
search, information, decision, contracting, measurement, monitoring, and enforcement costs 
can more than offset production cost advantages from outsourcing.6   
TCE views organizations as a complex web of contractual relationships among 
resource owners. Each relationship—the acquisition of an input, employment of a worker, 
transfer of a product or service from a supplier to a customer—is a transaction. In TCE, the 
transaction is the basic unit of analysis. The primary insight of TCE is that the choice of 
optimal governance mechanism (contracts, organizations, incentives) depends on key 
characteristics of the transaction (asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity, and frequency—
each of which are discussed in this study).  
In business, two costs typically drive the “make-or-buy?” decision: production costs 
and the costs of managing transactions or “transaction costs.” Conventional economic 
analysis focuses on production costs (input costs, competition, learning curves, economies 
                                                                                                                                                    
good, service, or intermediate product, and where (in many cases) the government also relinquishes its role to 
provide it.  
5 Today, businesses tend to restrict production to their core competencies and acquire the other parts of their 
products from outside suppliers.  For example, one might expect an automobile manufacturer to accomplish the 
final assembly of the cars it sells, but acquire tires from outside companies.  Less obvious is the case of a 
windshield. 
6 To use a physical analog, the market is not a frictionless medium.  Operations in the marketplace require 




= - 233 - 
=
=
of scale and scope, etc.). The new field of TCE emphasizes transaction costs (search and 
information costs, decision and contracting costs, monitoring and enforcement costs, etc.).  
One of the most critical contributions of TCE is to focus on the nontrivial costs of 
managing and coordinating transactions. For example, consider DoD’s Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA). This $1.1 billion organization is made up of 10,500 Civilians 
and 600 Military whose exclusive responsibility is to help manage and coordinate some 
300,000 defense contracts valued at nearly $950 billion. 
For a given product or service, the decision whether to “make or buy?” requires 
minimizing the sum of production and transaction costs. According to TCE, the dual focus of 
any outsourcing evaluation should be: a) to sort transactions into categories based upon 
certain key transaction characteristics, and b) to evaluate the costs and consequences of 
alternative contracts, organizational structures and mechanisms available to govern those 
transactions. Strategic contracting tools and other governance mechanisms can be applied 
to lower transaction costs. The lower the transaction costs of outsourcing, the smaller 
production cost savings need to be to support the decision to outsource.  
C) The Challenges of Coordination and Motivation 
Two key components of the “make-or-buy?” decision are highlighted in TCE: 
coordination and motivation. The issue of coordination arises from the economic opportunity 
for specialization and exchange. Organizations tend to specialize in “core” (inherently 
governmental) activities in which they have a comparative advantage, and engage in 
transactions (or outsource) to acquire other resources (e.g., contract labor), intermediate 
goods (material supplies, equipment, platforms, etc.), or services (IT, building maintenance, 
etc.). Transactions between government and industry can generate substantial gains for 
both parties. In DoD, the gains from specialization and exchange (outsourcing) are expected 
to take the form of more and better products, delivered more quickly, and with fewer 
resources (i.e., performance, schedule, and cost).  
TCE recognizes these potential gains, but also acknowledges the dark side of 
transactions—motivation. TCE predicts parties involved in a transaction can benefit from 
cooperative agreements, but since they are assumed to be self-interested and to have 
conflicting objectives, they will not always have the motivation to follow through on 
agreements—particularly when specific assets/investments are involved, and information is 
imperfect (incomplete and uncertain) or asymmetric (one party has an information 
advantage over the other). The ultimate outcome depends on specific characteristics of the 
transaction and on the incentive structures that govern the parties involved.  
D) Limits to Government as an Enterprise 
The concepts of TCE also hold inside the government. Coase (1937) and others 
contend “the operation of the market costs something and by forming an organization and 
allowing some authority to direct resources, certain [transaction] costs are saved” (p. 392). 
But the cure—integrating transactions inside the government—can be worse than the 
disease. When price and contract mechanisms are supplanted by internal coordination, this 
entails risks of sub-optimization, internal opportunistic behavior, multi-tasking, as well as 
internal bureaucratic costs of coordinating, monitoring and improving the cost and quality of 
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For example, consider the conflicting objectives and incentives that face major 
players in defense acquisition. The recently released Kadish report raises serious concerns 
about the ability of the Defense Acquisition System to “develop and deliver required 
capabilities when needed and at predictable [production] costs” (Kadish et al., Dec. 2005, 
“Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment, for the Acting Deputy Secretary of 
Defense,” p.1). The authors point to three key challenges: 1) “Requirements developers 
mandate systems that are technologically unrealistic or unable to be delivered within the 
‘time-to-need’ that is desired by Combatant Commanders;” 2) “Program management teams 
allow requirements to escalate without discipline, driving costs beyond baseline budget and 
schedule;” and 3) “Those who hold the budget purse strings in DoD […] reduce annual 
program budgets to fit within the “top-line” of the President’s Budget by trading-off some 
programs to ‘fix’ others” (p. 7). Prendergast (1999) provides a valuable overview of principal-
agent models that highlight the costs and consequences of various incentive mechanisms 
designed to address internal coordination and motivation issues.7 
In TCE, the successful resolution of resource allocation problems rests on designing 
mechanisms (incentives, organizations, markets, contracts, etc.) that allow opportunistic 
individuals with conflicting objectives to overcome their collective action problems in pursuit 
of mutual gains (Williamson & Masten, 1999). In the case of government outsourcing, TCE 
assumes government “principals” and industry “agents” each behave according to their 
conflicting interests. The objective of the DoD “principal” in outsourcing is to obtain goods 
and services better, faster, cheaper. Meanwhile, industry “agents” must guarantee market 
returns to shareholders (or maximize profits) to survive. The challenge is to arrive at 
governance structures that align the interests of both participants in the transaction.  
E) The “Principal-Agent” Model 
TCE assumes that economic actors—say government “principals” and defense 
industry “agents” in an outsourcing relationship—are motivated to look ahead, recognize 
potential hazards, and factor these into contracts or organizational design. However, due to 
the problem of “bounded rationality,” so named by Nobel Prize winner Herb Simon, their 
capacity to do so is limited. Rubin (1990) puts it somewhat differently: “it is impossible to 
write a [complete] contract to protect a firm’s interests in a situation of complex contracting” 
(p. 26).  
While parties to a transaction may jointly benefit from cooperation, they will not 
necessarily have incentives to live up to the terms of an incomplete contract and cannot 
expect others to do so (Williamson & Masten, 1999). The challenge is to design contracts, 
incentive schemes, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and to adopt other 
governance arrangements (property rights, reputation, bonding, warranties, etc.) that allow 
for credible commitments ex-ante and that promote mutual compliance ex-post (Williamson, 
1983). 
                                                
7 An important distinction is made in the literature between complete and incomplete contract theory. Under 
complete contracting, all payments and actions can be specified ex-ante. The contracting parties can (costlessly) 
write contracts that describe their actions given all future contingencies. In contrast, under incomplete contracting 
due to information costs, bounded rationality, asset specificity, etc., some contingencies are left out of contracts, 
or, if included, might not be enforceable. Incomplete contracting thus implies some actions and payments will 
have to be determined ex-post, requiring adaptation and renegotiation. Complete contracting theory has 
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In game theory, the principal and the agent are both equipped with full knowledge of 
the set of actions the agent can engage in, and the principal fully knows those actions 
he/she is allowed to engage in. The principal is usually only ignorant about the precise effort 
level of the agent and the realization of an exogenous stochastic variable that impacts the 
output of the agent.  
Instead of focusing exclusively on designing incentives to align the interests of the 
principal and the agent, Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1989) address the 
perspective of incomplete contracting where bargaining problems can constrain efficient 
production. They demonstrate how the selective ownership of assets or property rights can 
alleviate many incentive and bargaining concerns. However, this approach to incomplete 
contracting assumes the outcome of the renegotiation process can be foreseen when 
contracts are written, and that the process does not involve costly bargaining. Tirole (1998) 
argues that clever mechanisms can be designed to handle unverifiable contract terms, 
returning the problem to one of complete contracting in the principal-agent tradition.  
Here we take a broader-brush, stylized bargaining-game approach in the spirit of 
incomplete contracting. This approach is more closely aligned with the governance branch 
of TCE (Williamson & Masten 1999), where the main focus is on ex-post adaptation under 
incomplete contracting. In a model presented in Appendix A, the impact of costly ex-post bi-
lateral bargaining and rent-seeking activity is explored when the outcome of renegotiation 
cannot entirely be foreseen.8 
F) A Key Characteristic of Transactions: Asset Specificity 
The specialization that takes place in certain transactions creates opportunities for 
enormous cost savings from productivity improvements, boosts in product performance, and 
tailored delivery schedules. These gains in cost, performance and schedules are frequently 
generated by investments in assets that are specific to the transaction. Thus, a vital TCE 
characteristic that defines many outsourcing transactions is the degree of asset specificity.9 
Related to the notion of sunk costs, specific assets are investments made by parties to a 
transaction that lose much of their value in an alternative use. Examples include:   
o Physical Asset Specificity—investments in specialized tools and equipment, 
o Human Asset Specificity—investments in specialized skills, methods 
(government accounting), knowledge, training, etc.,  
o Site Specificity—investments in location (of equipment, facilities, etc.) that 
economize on transportation or inventory costs, 
                                                
8 Rent-seeking is the process of an individual seeking to profit from manipulation of the economic situation 
versus through trade and mutual benefit of the partners. 
9 A crude measure of the degree of asset specificity is to take the cost of the initial investment and subtract any 
depreciation (physical wear and tear and obsolescence) and the salvage (or current market) value. Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) emphasizes that if the value of such transaction-specific assets is substantially lower in 
alternative uses (analogous to sunk costs), a “Holdup” problem can arise that limits specific investments, and 
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o Dedicated Asset Specificity—investments in dedicated capacity and 
infrastructure (e.g., minimum efficient scale production facilities) for a 
particular customer,  
o Brand-name Specificity—investments where the reputation of one party to the 
transaction depends on the actions/reputation of another (as with franchises, 
or public activities that represent and reflect the government), and 
o Temporal Specificity—investments in “critical path” or bottleneck activities 
that can have enormous impacts on schedule completion costs and dates.  
When specific assets are important and there are many competing suppliers bidding 
for an outsourcing transaction, it may at first appear that the market is competitive. However, 
Williamson (1999) points out that in many outsourcing transactions, “the winner of the 
original contract acquires a cost [or first mover] advantage (such as unique location or 
learning, including the acquisition of undisclosed or proprietary technical and managerial 
procedures and task-specific skills)” (p. 27).  If the buyer (DoD) becomes dependent on a 
winning supplier that makes significant investments in specific assets (raising barriers to 
entry and the costs of switching to alternative suppliers), then ex-ante competition can yield 
to an ex-post buyer-seller bilateral monopoly situation. Rubin (1990) refers to this as the 
“fundamental transformation.”10  
G) The “Holdup” Problem  
In TCE, the combination of transaction-specific investments and an absence of ex-
post competition raises the possibility of a “holdup.” The “foot-in-the-door” strategy adopted 
by some defense contractors offers an example. In that case, a low bid induces the 
government to hire the contractor, but the contractor anticipates that as it works closely with 
the government, and as it makes specific investments that facilitate that relationship (e.g., 
human and physical asset specificity), the government will become increasingly dependent 
on that contractor.  
For instance, since research and development contracts are necessarily incomplete 
and unexpected requirements often arise, a contractor might anticipate higher returns from 
later “holding up” the government by raising the price for “change orders” (changes in the 
contract).11 Alternatively, the government has the power to hold up the firm by threatening 
                                                
10  Several demonstrative cases come to the minds of the authors, such as the Army Tactical Missile System 
(ATACMS) development contract being awarded to the developer of the vehicle platform.  And innumerable 
production contracts have been similarly been awarded to prime system developers.  However, one way to 
address the Holdup concern is with the strategic use of production options in a developmental project.  Such was 
the case when in 1990, LTV Corporation had responded to the Army with “not-to-exceed” missile production 
costs as part of their proposal for a fixed-price development contract for missile and launcher integration.  The 
options proposed had an expiration date.  So the government was incentivized to fund the program and 
accomplish program decisions before expiration, while the contractor was motivated to seek cost savings in 
order to maximize profits under an eventual production scenario.  The options were, in fact, exercised with only a 
few days to spare, and just in time to produce missiles employed during the first Gulf War. 
11  Demsetz (1968), Stigler (1968) and Posner (1972) suggest repeated bidding as a means to prevent ex-post 
opportunism in the case of government’s outsourcing a (regulated) natural monopoly. However, Williamson 
(1985, Chap 13) emphasizes that switching costs—related to specific investments—pose a hazard associated 
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to “walk away” from the relationship—say if demand for the product or service falls due to 
changes in the political or defense environment. 
If individuals, firms, or organizations cannot be assured of realizing the full value of a 
transaction-specific investment through a credible commitment not to partake in post-
contractual opportunistic behavior, then efficient productivity-, schedule- or performance-
enhancing specific investments might not be made. In turn, this reduces both the surplus 
generated from a transaction and the incentive for parties to engage in that transaction. 
The holdup problem arises whenever any party to a contract that involves a specific 
asset worries that after it has sunk an investment, it may be forced to accept worse terms 
ex-post, or that its investment might somehow be devalued by its contracting partner. Asset 
specificity lies at the core of the holdup problem, particularly in the case of complex and 
uncertain transactions that lead to incomplete contracting.  
One concern is that the party that has less invested in the transaction may attempt to 
expropriate some of the value of its partner’s specific investment(s) through ex-post 
bargaining—say by threatening to walk away from the relationship. Thus, asset specificity 
makes asset owners vulnerable to “free-riding” by their contracting partners.  
For example, while on one hand, the Kadish Report (2005) talks about the challenge 
of “motivating industry investments in future technology [and] encouraging industrial 
investment in areas of importance to the Department” (p.14), on the other hand it observes 
that government cost (budget cuts) and schedule (stretching out programs) instability has 
been a problem in all system acquisitions since the Civil War. As a consequence, 
transactions that require a significant degree of specific investments normally also require 
contracts and governance structures that protect the investor against early termination or 
opportunistic ex-post renegotiation.  
The added risk faced by military contractors subject to political and budgetary 
uncertainty tends to dampen their enthusiasm for defense-specific investments. For 
example, Air Force sources indicate that, in early production stages, faced with uncertainty 
about the ultimate production run of the F-16, General Dynamics refused to make specific 
investments in the tooling and equipment required to automate riveting to reduce costs. As a 
result, the wings of these high-tech aircraft were initially riveted by hand. According to 
Kadish et al. (2005), while the “defense acquisition process […] requires extended planning 
horizons, the Department’s budgeting process is based on short-term decision making” (p. 
6) . The outcome is “government-induced instability.” The report proposes a new 
governance structure to mitigate this uncertainty and add stability to major defense 
acquisition programs—an “Acquisition Stabilization Account.”12 
                                                                                                                                                    
switching costs may increase due to specific training/experience and other investments in transaction-specific 
assets, such that staying together can yield a surplus relative to trading with other parties. 
12 Another example comes from an author’s experience in the Javelin anti-tank missile program, wherein the 
procurement objective was halved as the product entered production. This resulted in a change to the production 
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H) Solutions to the “Holdup” Problem  
The government can overcome incentives for contractors to under-invest in specific 
assets—for example, to adopt labor-intensive as opposed to more efficient capital-intensive 
production choices (with consequent higher prices)—by shifting the risk away from 
contractors. The risk to contractors can perhaps be reduced through stabilization accounts, 
or through contractual means by introducing contingent clauses that reward these 
investments through incentive contracts. Solving the asset-specificity problem can also be 
accomplished—and the risk to contractors eliminated—simply by shifting the ownership of 
strategic assets to the government. This “property rights” approach is discussed in 
Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart (1995). In DoD facilities, for example, government 
ownership of specific assets is known as “Government Owned, Contractor Operated” 
(GOCO).  
In the extreme, the government might choose to internalize the entire transaction 
(vertical integration), or to make rather than buy (as in Government Owned, Government 
Operated—GOGO facilities). The optimum choice for DoD (COCO, GOCO or GOGO) 
ultimately depends on an evaluation of production and transaction costs, product 
performance, and schedule and delivery options.13 
I) Alternative Governance Structures  
TCE recognizes that transactions can be organized under a spectrum of governance 
structures ranging from spot markets to vertical integration. Between these two poles are 
contracts of increasing duration and complexity—from Fixed Price (FP) to Cost Plus (C+), 
and from simple short-term contracts, to incentive, long-term, and relational contracts 
(McAfee & McMillan, 1988). Outsourcing involves a move away from vertical integration to 
spot market transactions or one of the intermediate or “hybrid” contracting options.14 
According to Williamson (1999), three key attributes differentiate governance 
structures: 1) incentives, 2) administrative controls, and 3) dispute settlement (or 
adaptation). Spot market purchases are characterized by high-powered incentives, little 
administrative control and a legalistic dispute settling mechanism. Unfortunately, while 
market governance provides strong, high-powered incentives for quality and cost, it offers 
little protection for specific investments since buyers and sellers can easily walk away from 
transactions. Thus, the transaction costs of dealing with markets increases with the potential 
for holdups. In contrast, whereas vertical integration (organic production) alleviates holdups 
since dispute settlement takes place largely within the organization, it combines low-
powered incentives with extensive administrative (bureaucratic) controls.  
                                                
13 The government might also retain some in-house (perhaps standby) capability to provide the good or service in 
question (known as “tapered integration.”). This, and similar measures, could enhance the DoD’s bargaining 
position in the event of renegotiation or contract-enforcement actions.  Changing the ownership of assets 
associated with relation-specific investments can also reduce the scope for opportunistic behavior. This can take 
the form of government-furnished equipment in defense transactions (GOCO).  However, such hedging 
measures entail costs that can dissipate the potential gains from outsourcing. 
14 Note that the recent wave of mergers and acquisitions that emphasized vertical integration in the US may 
finally be giving way to the so-called virtual corporation. It appears strategic outsourcing through contracts, 
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A path-breaking econometric study (Masten et al. 1991) based on the procurement 
of components and services by a large naval shipbuilder indicates overall organization costs 
represent about 14% of total costs for components and activities in the sample. More 
importantly, “these costs vary systematically with the nature of the transaction and […] 
savings from choosing organizational arrangements selectively can be substantial.” 
Interestingly, the authors find that “subcontracting work currently performed inside […] 
would, on average, generate market organization costs almost three times those incurred 
managing that work internally,” and that as “the costs of dealing across a market interface 
[…] rise the greater the potential for holdups in a given transaction […]” (p. 2).  Of course, 
adopting new technology like the Internet and leveraging the falling cost of computer and 
communications equipment can reduce the “costs of dealing across a market interface.” 
Short of vertical integration (in-house production), contracts, strategic alliances, 
partnerships, joint ventures, etc., can be designed to provide some protection for assets 
while still preserving market incentives. The challenge is that the benefits from the 
transaction be divided in such a way that they induce the efficient amount of specific 
investment(s) in the contracting relationship. This involves writing a contract with enough 
precision to assure desired performance, but with enough flexibility to allow productive 
adaptation, as circumstances require. The challenge increases the greater the degree of 
asset specificity and the more complex and uncertain the transaction.  
Combined with bounded rationality, imperfect information tends to preclude 
comprehensive ex-ante contracting, making many contracts inherently incomplete. In turn, 
this raises the opportunity for holdups and ex-post renegotiation. In summary, TCE predicts 
the higher the degree of asset specificity, the greater the likelihood that vertical integration, 
longer-term contracts, and other mechanisms (reputation, GOCO, etc.) will be used to 
promote and protect transaction-specific investments.  
J) Some Empirical Evidence  
On the whole, the results of the empirical literature are consistent with these 
theoretical predictions. In the case of vertical integration, Monteverde and Teece (1982a) 
found automobile components that required greater design engineering (human asset 
specificity) were more likely to be vertically integrated (or less likely to be outsourced).15 
Moreover, according to the Masten et al. (1991) study of subcontracting practices in naval 
construction, the probability of vertical integration increased with the temporal specificity of 
particular construction activities. This is because any delay in these key critical path 
activities would disrupt the overall completion time of the project. If such a product was 
outsourced instead of vertically integrated, subcontractors could threaten a delay (holdup) in 
exchange for price concessions (increasing transaction costs). Reputation is another 
important enforcement mechanism that can be used to alleviate this problem, especially in 
the case of repeated relationships.16  We’ll observe in Section 3 that “past performance” is 
                                                
15 A specific example comes from the decision of prime system developer Texas Instruments to make their own 
critical component of the Javelin anti-tank missile system: the matrix focal plane array.  This item became the 
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used as a criteria for subsequent contract awards, revealing that reputation is indeed a 
mechanism used to encourage specific investments and avoid holdups in practice. 
There is evidence that longer term contracts are used as a mechanism to mitigate 
the risk of holdup between coal mines and electric utilities that involve greater levels of asset 
specificity. Joskow (1987) examines transactions between coal mines (sellers) and electric 
utilities (buyers). The study reveals two interesting cases.  In the West—where there are few 
coal mines, more limited transportation, and different grades of coal—there is a higher 
degree of asset specificity associated with transactions, and greater threat of ex-post 
opportunism. As predicted by TCE, Joskow reports transactions in the West tend to be 
governed by longer-term contracts, and that spot markets are virtually non-existent.17  
In sharp contrast, in the Eastern United States—where there are many electric 
utilities and coal mines, abundant and competitive transportation, and coal is largely 
homogeneous—there is a lower degree of asset specificity associated with transactions, 
and consequently a smaller threat of ex-post opportunism. As predicted by TCE, Joskow 
reports transactions largely occur in spot markets governed by short-term contracts.  
With respect to other mechanisms that can help promote and protect physical asset 
specificity—such as Government Owned, Contractor Operated (GOCO) specific assets—
Monteverde and Teece (1982b)  found automobile manufacturers were more likely to own 
the tooling used by their suppliers, the more specialized and expensive it was. Moreover, 
according to Klein et al. (1978), General Motors’ decision to acquire (or vertically integrate) 
Fisher Body was partly influenced by the need for transaction-specific investments in new 
stamping presses and dies (physical asset specificity). (The Fisher Body story has become 
a matter of some controversy.18)  
Finally, an important lesson is that government must commit not to expropriate 
assets from contractors or regulated firms if it wants them to invest in transaction-specific 
assets. Levy and Spiller’s (1994) international comparison of telecommunications regulation 
demonstrates that only if regulators commit not to pursue arbitrary administrative actions 
that threaten the value of specific assets, will private (specific) investment be forthcoming. 
For instance, where regulators failed to commit not to set arbitrarily low prices, regulated 
                                                                                                                                                    
16 For example, Acheson (1985) found that in fish markets, given a price for a catch, buyers (sellers) could act 
opportunistically by sorting individual high-quality (low-quality) fish. Monitoring could be used to avoid this, but 
increases transaction costs and lowers the surplus enjoyed by both parties. Instead, informal reputation-based 
agreements served to avoid these extra costs. 
17 Moreover, Joskow (1985) reports that when electricity plants locate themselves near coal mines to avoid high 
transportation costs (site specificity), they must be tailored to the grade of coal (physical asset specificity). As 
TCE predicts, the measures of vertical integration and explicit long-term contracts are common. In fact, these so-
called “mine-mouth plants” were six times more likely to own the associated mine than other electricity 
generators. Those contracts are typically twenty to fifty years in duration, with provisions that prohibit price 
renegotiation for extended periods, specify in detail quantities to be supplied over the period, specify the quality 
of coal, index costs and the prices of substitutes, and defined procedures for arbitration in the event of disputes. 
18 Coase (2000), Casadesus-Masanell and Spulber (2000) regard the standard story as a “fable,” flawed in both 
fact and interpretation. Freeland (2000) goes further and contends that vertical integration made General Motors 
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firms were unwilling to make specific infrastructure investments because they feared they 
might not be able to recover the value of those investments. 
K) Other TCE Characteristics: Complexity, Uncertainty and Frequency  
Besides asset specificity, transactions are also characterized by complexity and 
uncertainty. Crocker and Masten (1988) address the impact of uncertainty on contract 
duration. They find that government’s regulation of the price of natural gas, in reducing the 
ability of parties to adapt long-term contracts to reflect future uncertainty, reduced contract 
lengths in the industry by an average of 14 years.19 The greater the uncertainty, the shorter 
was the duration of the contract. 
A study by Bajari and Tadelis (1999) on construction contracts provides evidence 
that complexity and uncertainty are sufficient to generate ex-post adaptation and 
renegotiation—even in the absence of specific investments. It turns out that the decision to 
govern construction transactions with Fixed Price (FP) type contracts, as opposed to Cost 
Plus (C+) type contracts, is sensitive to the complexity and uncertainty in the transaction. 
Interestingly, a counterpart to this example exists in governance options prescribed by the 
US military for outsourcing various phases in a new product’s development (see Table 1 
below).  
Evidence uncovered by Bajari and Tadelis (1999) reveals that in cases where a 
construction transaction is easy to define and measure—i.e., there is little complexity, and 
only a few minor changes are expected, there is little uncertainty and FP contracts tend to 
dominate. However, the more complex and uncertain the transaction (and the more difficult 
and costly it is to define and measure performance) the more likely a change in the contract 
will be required, and the more severe the adversarial relationships experienced ex-post 
when FP contracts were chosen.  
In the latter case, FP type contracts often ended in costly renegotiations where any 
surplus generated in the transaction was dissipated in the course of negotiations through 
unproductive bargaining and influence activities. Thus, even in the absence of asset 
specificity, complexity and uncertainty can force parties to turn to C+ type contracts and to 
rely heavily on reputation and other enforcement mechanisms to avoid ex-post opportunistic 
behavior that can dissipate the surplus (or value) generated by a transaction.  
Relating these observations to military outsourcing for major weapon systems, 
empirical evidence uncovered by Crocker and Reynolds (1993) for the manufacture of US 
Air Force aircraft engines mirror the findings in Bajari and Tadelis (1999). In the initial 
production stages—when modifications were expected—contracts that governed 
transactions tended to be of the cost reimbursement variety (C+). In later production 
stages—after initial problems had been ironed out—contracts tended to be of the fixed price 
variety (FP). Of course, this kind of selection of contract type has become a matter of well-
known policy. For purposes of illustration, Table 1 summarizes prescribed contract types 
employed by the US Air Force and Navy at each stage of development of a new product 
(Federal Acquisition Institute, 1998). 
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Type (see list 
below) 









1. Fixed Price Contracts (FP) 
a. FP—Fixed Price: Ex-ante negotiated contract price is not subject to any 
adjustment based on actual ex-post costs of performing the contract. 
b. FPI—Fixed Price plus Incentive Fee: Contract provides for incentive based 
on pre-determined share of actual costs (profits) over (under) target costs 
(profits), or based on subjective measures of performance against standards. 
Firm ceiling price limits overall payments. 
c. FPEPA—Fixed Price with Economic Price Adjustment: Contract provides for 
price adjustments to reflect exogenous cost increases/decreases. 
d. FPPR—Fixed Price with Prospective Re-determination: Contract provides 
fixed price for first period and timetable for re-pricing over subsequent 
periods. 
 
2. Cost Reimbursement Contracts (C+) 
a. C+FF—Cost-plus-fixed fee: Contract pays allowable costs plus fixed fee (If 
FF=0 then same as Time & Materials, If FF<0, then Cost Sharing between 
government and contractor). 
b. C+I—Cost-plus-incentive fee: Contract pays allowable costs plus incentive 
fee based on assessments of performance (such as actual costs and delivery 
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Table 1 indicates FP (C+) type contracts are prescribed in later (earlier) stages of 
product development when complexity and uncertainty have (have not) been resolved, and 
the Performance Work Statement (PWS) is well (not well) defined, and that this results in 
relatively low (high) risks to the Government. Note that while these prescribed contracts 
focus on the characteristics of complexity and uncertainty, apparently overlooked is the vital 
role of asset specificity—one of the key insights of TCE.  
Another significant characteristic of transactions is frequency. Recurrent transactions 
often justify the setup costs of specialized assets and special governance requirements. 
They also offer the opportunity to apply learning curves (cumulative cost-quantity 
relationships) to lower production costs, and for gradual reductions in uncertainty as both 
parties learn more about costs. Recurring transactions also offer the possibility for the 
accumulation of goodwill and to build reputations. In summary, TCE emphasizes four key 
characteristics of transactions: asset specificity, complexity, uncertainty, and frequency.20 
L) Solving Governance Problems through Vertical Integration 
When asset specificity, bounded rationality (complexity and uncertainty), and 
opportunism make contracting problems too difficult (or external transaction costs too high), 
“the problems of incomplete contracting are often relieved by unified ownership” 
(Williamson, 1999).21 But when transactions occur within an organization, calculations must 
also include the costs of internal coordination and motivation. Whereas vertical integration 
brings transaction-specific assets under the control of one organization and reduces 
opportunism from holdup, hierarchies can’t control costs as effectively as markets—or suffer 
from “low-powered” incentives. Moreover, bounded rationality limits the span of effective 
internal managerial control, so that lower-level managers and employees often engage in 
multitasking, sub-optimizing, and unproductive rent-seeking behavior (Prendergast, 1999). 
Hierarchy in a government organization can lead to legitimate sub-optimization, 
where the joint pursuit of lower-level goals fails to coincide with the global objectives of the 
                                                
20 For purposes of illustration, consider two polar examples: A transaction that involves routine aircraft maintenance and one 
that involves defense Research & Development (R&D) on a major weapon system. In the case of recurring purchases of 
routine maintenance, the service is relatively homogeneous, not especially complex, and, therefore, can be well specified. 
Assuming there are mild information asymmetries and many competing suppliers employing mostly non-specific assets, market 
governance can be prescribed to minimize both production and transaction costs. Anytime competition exists among suppliers 
of well-specified homogeneous products, spot market purchases or simple FP contracts generally offer adequate governance 
structures to induce cooperative adaptation and minimize transaction costs. If government performs such functions, then 
public-private competitions are likely to reveal both production and transaction cost savings from outsourcing. In sharp 
contrast, a complex, nonrecurring defense R&D program involves challenges in specifying the product, service, or project as 
well as significant technical uncertainty over the results. Moreover, even if the R&D contract is let through ex-ante competitive 
bidding, “holdup” problems due to asset specificity may present significant cost control and ex-post bilateral dependency 
hazards.  
21 If such agreements turn out to be too costly to implement and enforce—or “maladaptation hazards” are too great—then 
outsourcing can give way to insourcing (or vertical integration) (Williamson, 1999). An important result of TCE is that 
internalizing transactions can reduce customer and provider incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior, and promotes the 
sharing of specialized information. Internalizing some activities under the direct control of a manager can economize on 
transaction costs, and (together with production cost considerations) these cost savings provide an efficiency basis for defining 
the boundaries of an organization. The main value of ownership integration is that it reduces buyer and seller incentives to 
engage in opportunistic behavior and promotes the sharing of specialized information. The choice of governance structure for 
any transaction—either insourcing (or vertical integration), or outsourcing (or spot market purchases)—depends upon both 
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organization.22 This often happens in the budget planning process with internal lobbying for 
resources. However, opportunism can compound the problem by introducing strategic 
efforts to gain local advantage at the expense of the larger group. Sub-optimization can thus 
expand to include the strategic use of asymmetric information for local benefit. As a 
consequence, while government in-sourcing can reduce ex-post opportunism due to holdup, 
the tradeoff includes: a) low-powered incentives, b) internal opportunistic behavior, and c) 
an increase in administrative costs. 23  
Anytime ex-ante competition among suppliers is transformed into an ex-post 
bilaterally dependent relationship, additional governance structures are required to induce 
cooperative adaptation.24 These structures can include anything from agreements to share 
and verify cost and performance information in incentive contracts to the careful crafting of 
dispute settlement mechanisms. However, such agreements often increase external 
transaction costs. The higher external transaction costs, the larger production cost savings 
need to be to support the decision to outsource. An underlying objective of TCE is to 
contribute to the design of contracts, organizations, and other governance structures to 
reduce transaction costs and improve the gains from exchange.  
M) A Case Study: Competitive Sourcing and OMB A-76 
Outsourcing relationships vary widely in their characteristics (asset specificity, 
uncertainty, complexity, frequency, etc.) and potential difficulties. As a consequence, 
increases in transaction costs (required to govern an outsourcing relationship) can more 
than offset any production cost advantages from outsourcing. Outsourcing relationships can 
                                                
22  A further complication (but beyond the scope of this discussion) is employee goals not congruent with the 
government’s.  This includes the strength of incentives for efficient operation.  Why, for example, should a 
contracting officer who is spending public funds (and not his own) be more diligent in monitoring performance 
when dealing with outside contractors than “in-house” supervisors are in dealing with internal procurement? 
23 Wintrobe (1977) offers a good review of the literature that analyzes the strategic behavior of a public 
monopolistic, budget-maximizing bureau—or internal agent (Niskanen, 1971), that can make take-it-or-leave-it 
budget proposals, and its sponsor—or internal principal. Mueller (1989) later replaces the assumption the bureau 
is allowed to make take-it-or-leave-it budget proposals with a model in which the sponsor chooses a desired level 
of output based on the bureau’s announced price per unit of output. Claar (1998) expands the role of the sponsor 
to regulate the bureau by allowing it to select both the level of output and the allowed price per unit, based on the 
bureau’s reported marginal cost. Adapting Baron and Myerson’s (1982) incentive compatibility framework for 
regulating a monopolist with unknown costs to the sponsor’s problem of monitoring a bureau with unknown 
costs, the welfare-maximizing pricing policy deviates from the standard efficient pricing policy, P=MC. The 
deviation of the optimal pricing policy from the usual P=MC pricing rule arises due to asymmetric information—or 
the informational advantage the bureau has concerning its own costs. Internal transaction costs must, therefore, 
include a subsidy paid by the sponsor in addition to MC to induce the bureau to report its costs truthfully. Baron 
and Besanko (1984) modify the Baron-Myerson model to permit the regulator to conduct random audits of costs. 
This introduces an additional transaction cost—monitoring costs. These examples point to the internal 
transaction costs (a subsidy to induce truthful reporting or monitoring costs to establish correct costs) that must 
be weighed against any production cost advantages that might exist from insourcing or internalizing transactions 
in government’s make or buy decisions.  
24 According to Williamson and Masten (1999), the “central problem of economic organization is adaptation” (p. 
xi). The challenge of adaptation is especially acute when ex-ante competition leads to ex-post monopoly power. 
Whenever products, services or projects cannot be well specified in advance (due to complexity, uncertainty 
about future conditions, measurement difficulties, etc.), and they involve transaction-specific assets, then ex-ante 
competition (e.g., competitive bidding) can lead to ex-post monopoly/monopsony power. In turn, this leads to 
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involve extra transaction costs such as measurement, monitoring, and negotiation costs that 
can quickly overwhelm a simple 10% production cost advantage.  
Another crucial insight of transaction cost analysis is that different ex-ante contracts 
offer different incentives for unproductive ex-post bargaining and influence activities.  
 If the performance work statement (PWS) describing the desired product, service or 
project can be specified precisely as an Invitation for Bid (IFB), and there are no transaction-
specific assets involved, then FP type contracts have the benefit of creating cost-reducing 
incentives that reward the buyer through ex-ante competition between potential suppliers. In 
this case, FP contracting increases contractor incentives to invest in cost reduction, and ex-
ante competition can transfer these cost-savings directly to the buyer.  
In contrast, if the PWS cannot be specified precisely such that there is a Request for 
Proposal (RFP), and/or if there are significant specific assets involved in the transaction, 
then some surplus will be eroded by the frictions of ex-post negotiation. This loss from 
bargaining activity is part of the cost of using a FP contract in this case. The more complex 
and uncertain the transaction, the less complete the PWS, the greater the cost in using FP, 
and the more attractive other contracting options become.25  
However, Bajari and Tadelis (1999) (citing Ashley & Workman, 1986) demonstrate 
that providing cost incentives in a contract is more likely to lead to disagreements and 
spoiled relationships and ex-post friction in interpreting the outcomes. In fact, avoiding these 
frictions and reducing the advantages to renegotiation can be accomplished by investing in 
a more complete PWS, and by adopting alternative mechanisms (reputation, etc.) to reduce 
the return from opportunistic bargaining behavior. 
TCE suggests that the degree of completeness of the PWS and the contract is an 
optimizing decision by both parties that reflects their trade-offs between an ex-ante 
investment in the PWS and contract design, and the potential ex-post cost of opportunistic 
bargaining and renegotiation. Moreover, since the principal insight of TCE is that the choice 
of optimal governance structure depends on the characteristics of the transaction, the dual 
focus of any outsourcing evaluation should be: a) to sort transactions into categories based 
on their principal characteristics (asset specificity, uncertainty, complexity, and frequency), 
and b) to evaluate the costs and consequences of alternative contracts, organizational 
structures and mechanisms available to govern those transactions.  
N) Results from a Bargaining-game Model of Transactions  
A fundamental insight of TCE is the importance of uncovering both production and 
transaction costs associated with the “make-or-buy?” decision. Here, comparative static 
results from a stylized bargaining game model developed in Appendix A are applied to the 
special case of public-private competitions regulated by OMB Circular A-76. This approach 
reveals characteristics of transactions that can be used to distinguish between two 
                                                
25 This might best be illustrated with the A-12 advanced stealth bomber aircraft program: an example of false 
security from government risk placed in a fixed-price type of contract chosen for a large complex development 
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categories of internal government transactions: “good” as opposed to “more challenging” 
candidates for outsourcing.  
According to the documents, five steps are required to conduct a public-private 
competition for an activity currently done by the government: 
1. Develop a Performance Work Statement (PWS) to define performance and a Quality 
Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) to measure performance. 
2. Construct a Most Efficient Organization (MEO) for the insourcing (in-house) cost 
estimate. 
3. Prepare an Invitation for Bid (IFB) for well-defined, routine commercial activities, or a 
Request for Proposal (RFP) for ill-defined, complex, uncertain projects that involve 
specific assets. 
4. Compare bids or proposals with the in-house estimate, and select a winner. In the 
case of an IFB, the concern is to minimize costs. In the case of an RFP, the concern 
is cost-effectiveness. In the case of an IFB, continue to in-source unless the 
government can obtain equivalent performance and threshold savings are above 
10% of direct personnel costs or a cumulative $10 million over the performance 
period. The same holds for the case of RFP, with the further possibility of 
outsourcing if it is judged significantly better performance can be achieved at the 
same cost as the MEO. 
5. Address appeals. 
O) Characteristics of Good Candidates for Outsourcing  
Where a transaction requires little in the way of specific assets (no holdup problem), 
and involves a product or service that is a) well-defined and homogeneous (IFB), b) easy to 
measure (limited complexity and mild information asymmetry), c) routinely used 
(recurring/frequent purchases), d) not subject to change (limited demand uncertainty), and 
e) is offered by competing suppliers, then there is little room for negotiation (price and 
performance are market-driven), and the marginal benefit of unproductive bargaining is 
essentially zero. With little room for bargaining over such routine and uncomplicated 
transactions, substantial production and transaction cost savings can be expected from 
outsourcing, or from purchasing directly in spot markets (say over the Internet). (This can be 
seen directly from [3a,b] in Appendix A: since if σ =0, then b=0).  
Moreover, since administrative, incentive, and enforcement costs tend to be low for 
goods and services produced in competitive markets, the marginal cost of engaging in the 
transaction is small, and the marginal cost of unproductive effort is high. This ratio 
encourages greater effort (ei) and investment in the transaction and, ceteris paribus, tends 
to generate a larger surplus (S), or a higher return to outsourcing (See Appendix A). 
In general, the less complex and uncertain a transaction, the easier it is to write an 
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administrative and enforcement costs of that contract, the higher the expected marginal cost 
of ex-post bargaining or rent-seeking activity, and the lower the expected return from that 
activity. This reduces optimal ex-post bargaining (b), thus lowering transaction costs 
associated with outsourcing. The favorable characteristics of these so-called good 
candidates tend to encourage greater productive effort that in turn contributes to a larger 
surplus (value) enjoyed by both parties, increasing the returns from outsourcing. 
P) Characteristics of More Challenging Candidates for Outsourcing 
More challenging candidates include transactions that involve non-standard 
(differentiated) products or services that take place in a bilateral contractual setting. In this 
case, assuming no specific assets are required, the results (bargaining, b, effort, e, and 
surplus, S) depend on the degree of contractual ambiguity governing the transaction, as well 
as on any administrative and enforcement costs involved. However, as complexity, 
uncertainty, and opportunism due to specific investments increase, so does the marginal 
benefit of bargaining or ex-post renegotiation. This results in higher external transaction 
costs that need to be offset by more substantial production cost savings in order to justify 
outsourcing.  
Productive investment (effort in the model) can be thought of as involving two types 
of assets: general and specific. The greater the ratio of specific assets to total investment, 
the greater the risk of “holdup.” Moreover, as the threat of bilateral dependency increases, 
the more incomplete the contract (and the lower the penalty for reneging or renegotiation), 
the lower the marginal cost to each party of engaging in unproductive bargaining or 
influence activities (i.e., the lower γ ). In the face of incomplete contracting, the holdup 
problem poses a hazard Williamson calls “maladaptation.” Maladaptation is captured here 
as an increase in the return to both parties in unproductive bargaining (i.e., an increase in σ ). From Appendix A, as σ  increases and γ  decreases, a greater amount of unproductive 
bargaining (b), and a lower productive effort or investment (e) can be expected, that will 
lower the surplus (S) enjoyed by both parties to the transaction.  
Any time ex-ante competition among suppliers is transformed into an ex-post 
bilaterally dependent relationship, additional governance structures may be required to 
induce cooperative adaptation. The challenge is to write a contract with enough precision to 
encourage desired performance, but enough flexibility to allow productive adaptation 
(adjustments), as circumstances require. But in the case of complex transactions and 
uncertain outcomes, “bounded rationality” precludes comprehensive ex-ante contracting 
(contracts are inherently incomplete) which raises the possibility of gains from 
(unproductive) ex-post opportunistic bargaining and renegotiation (e.g., the “holdup” 
problem).  
Contracting, therefore, offers an imperfect solution to opportunism. What are 
required are additional governance mechanisms (rules and regulations, reputation 
mechanisms, GOCO, etc.) to settle disputes and adapt to new conditions, and ex-ante 
efforts to screen for reliability and reputation or to safeguard and protect transaction-specific 
investments (i.e., lowering the marginal return to bargaining, σ , and raising the marginal 
cost, γ ). These structures can include anything from agreements to share and verify cost 
and performance information through incentive contracts, to the careful crafting of dispute 
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managers recognize key characteristics of transactions that could guide them to choose an 
appropriate contract type and governance mechanism to improve outcomes in terms of 
performance, cost and schedule. 
SECTION 3:  DEFENSE MATERIEL ACQUISITION 
This section describes the current acquisition transactional environment and 
provides a synthesis of acquisition transaction components and their strata of governance, 
followed by an overview of associated management practices in the DoD.   
A) The Transactional Environment 
The Defense Acquisition System exists to manage the nation’s investments in technologies, 
programs, and product support necessary to achieve the National Security Strategy and 
support the United States Armed Forces. The investment strategy of the Department of 
Defense shall be postured to support not only today’s force, but also the next force, and 
future forces beyond that. The primary objective of defense acquisition is to acquire 
quality products that satisfy user needs with measurable improvements to mission 
capability and operational support, in a timely manner, and at a fair and reasonable 
price. (Department of Defense Directive 5000.1)  
“Acquisition” is the acquiring of supplies or services (including construction) by 
contract with appropriated funds by and for the use of the Federal Government through 
purchase or lease (FAR Part 2.101b).  The realm of defense acquisition extends from the 
development and procurement of materiel, to purchasing services and sustaining support for 
our military. Government acquisition is unique as a public enterprise.   
While many businesses and public agencies conduct internal product development 
for themselves and others (or conduct external projects for others), the Department of 
Defense, for the most part, commissions external suppliers to conduct projects for its 
internal use.  In short, the DoD outsources much of what we consider to be “acquisition,” 
with all of the attendant transaction costs of search, information, decision, contracting, 
measurement, monitoring, and enforcement.   
Defense developmental projects, and their later procurement, are often seen as 
among the most challenging acquisition endeavors, because of their large size and 
technological complexity.  Such transactions are undertaken with contracts in the context of 
inter-firm collaboration: where a client firm engages an outside supplier to design and/or 
engineer a component, subsystem or process (Carson, Madhok, Vasrman & John, 2003).  
Unique also are the performance, quality and security requirements of materiel.  The 
extremes of combat environments often place products and end-users at risk of physical 
harm, and any failures in performance, timeliness or cost can significantly impact national 
security.   
The government’s goal orientation in its development and procurement pursuits is 
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The Federal Acquisition System will—(1) Satisfy the customer in terms of cost, quality, and 
timeliness of the delivered product or service by, for example—(i) Maximizing the use of 
commercial products and services; (ii) Using contractors who have a track record of 
successful past performance or who demonstrate a current superior ability to perform; and 
(iii) Promoting competition; (2) Minimize administrative operating costs; (3) Conduct 
business with integrity, fairness, and openness; and (4) Fulfill public policy objectives. 
(FAR, 2004, Part 1.102) 
 
This is in concert with the opening quote above from DoD Directive 5000.1, but goes 
a bit further by describing the desired nature of acquisition transactions.  It can be assumed 
that there is often significant goal incongruence in public-private outsourcing relationships: 
the government seeks the best possible value of goods and services for the least cost to the 
taxpayer, while private industry typically seeks to maximize profit and avoid competition.  But 
such fundamental goal differences notwithstanding, this buyer-seller partnership has 
historically yielded supreme American military capability, as well as profit for shareholders. 
Of course, the two questions often asked are whether we have purchased this capability at 
the best price, and whether the equipment, supplies and services get into the hands of our 
military in a timely manner. 
B) Contracting and Project Management 
Contracts are the governance mechanisms and transaction vehicles used to facilitate 
development or procurement expenditures.  Guiding the choice of contracts is the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and its DoD supplement, the Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulation Supplement (DFARS). The FAR consists of over 1900 pages that codify uniform 
policies and procedures for acquisition by all executive agencies of the US government.  
The DFARS adds over 1100 more pages of agency-specific policy and procedures to be 
followed by the Defense department in its contracts and purchases.  Authority for the award 
and administration of government contracts is vested in warranted contracting officers.  They 
typically reside in service-specific acquisition centers: organizations within larger “systems 
commands”∗ usually organized by commodity item, such as communications and 
electronics, aviation, and armaments, etc. 
The DoD uses project management techniques (GANTT Charts, Critical Path 
Methods, PERT, etc.) as a methodology to conduct its outsourced product development 
efforts, recognizing the unique and temporary nature of many projects.  Project 
management provides for a single point of contact, the program manager, who is the major 
force directing systems through their evolution and lifecycle: including design, development, 
production, deployment, operations and support, and disposal. The program manager (PM) 
has management authority and accountability for all business and technical aspects of a 
specific program.   
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Program Managers lead Program (Project or Product) Management Offices.  
Program Management Offices (PMOs) are part of the transaction costs of overseeing 
contracts. They provide the PM with further resources to manage the acquisition of materiel, 
supporting warfighters as end-users.  Many members of the acquisition workforce furnish 
either core or matrix support to a PMO.   
At the beginning of FY2000, the size of the DoD’s acquisition workforce was 
estimated to be 124,000 personnel (ADR, 2000).  The Defense industry’s suppliers typically 
follow the project management methodology established by the PM, and often contractors 
will staff and operate their program offices to parallel that of the government programs they 
support.  Both types of DoD managers, PMs and contracting officers, act as transaction 
agents to ensure that public funds are being used prudently to accomplish the mission, while 
also promoting public policy mandates (e.g., small and disadvantaged businesses), and 
ensuring that relevant Government regulations (e.g., safety) are enforced.   
The DOD 5000 series of regulations serves as overarching guidance for the 
acquisition of materiel—primarily materiel requiring new development and subsequent 
investment in production. DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, provides 
policies and principles to govern the management of all DoD acquisition programs. There 
are five major thrusts governing the overall acquisition system: 1) flexibility in shaping 
individual programs to meet needs, 2) responsiveness in achieving capabilities in accord 
with their timelines of need, and doing so in increments via evolutionary acquisition, 3) 
innovation via practices that reduce cycle-time and cost, 4) discipline in the adherence to 
goals, with program baseline parameters serving as control measures, and 5) effective 
management through decentralized responsibility and authority (DODD 5000.1, 2003).   
DoD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, establishes a 
management framework that translates mission needs and technological opportunities into 
stable, affordable, and well-managed acquisition programs (DODI 5000.2, 2003). The 
instruction provides procedures for operation of the acquisition management system in 
conjunction with a system of prioritizing and allocating funds (the Planning Programming, 
Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES)), as well as a system to generate materiel 
requirements (the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS)).  Together, 
they produce bonafide transaction needs, resources and technical performance solutions.  
The successful interaction of these three decision-support and management systems are 
the governance mechanisms relied on to produce advanced warfighting capability. 
C) Cost, Schedule and Performance Attributes are Stratified 
The first FAR principle stated above of customer satisfaction (including “cost, quality, 
and timeliness of the delivered product or service”) encompasses many of the key features 
of acquisition transactions.  Acquisition transactions can largely be categorized by their 
timeliness, dollar value, and technical performance requirements and characteristics (which 
are translated into measures of project management success).   
These characteristics are often identified and stratified in various policy and 
regulatory documents that affect acquisition procedures and governance.  The TCE 
characteristics of uncertainty and complexity are largely incorporated within the parameters 
of cost, schedule, and performance.  Asset specificity is not addressed per se; however, the 
DoD has long acknowledged the dangers of becoming “locked-in” to propriety technology (or 
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observe much less of this cautionary language today, possibly because of highly inelastic 
demand due to wars fought in Iraq and Afghanistan, or perhaps because the potential for 
“holdup” is simply being overlooked.  
Materiel acquisition is often viewed as occurring over a lifecycle—moving from initial 
concepts to engineering and development, into production (procurement) and to operations 
and maintenance/support until eventual disposal. See Figure 1 below. This lifecycle involves 
a product’s maturation that tends to reduce uncertainty and complexity as the product is 




Figure 1. Defense Acquisition Decision Reviews and Phases 
 
The funding comes from several different sources and involves different contracts. 
For developmental systems acquisition endeavors, the funding comes from the Research 
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E). Procurement appropriations are used to 
acquire the actual systems, with sustainment expenditures coming from Operations and 
Maintenance. RDT&E and Procurement appropriations are often termed the “investment 
accounts,” and together they typically comprise roughly one-third of the annual defense 
budget in any given year.   
RDT&E funds are further categorized to reflect different types of research efforts: 1) 
Basic Research, 2) Applied Research, 3) Advanced Technology Development, 4) Advanced 
Component Development and Prototypes, 5) System Development and Demonstration, 6) 




= - 252 - 
=
=
it can be noted that the activity categories and purposes correlate somewhat to degree of 
end product (i.e., system) applicability or technological maturity (corresponding with a 
reduction in uncertainty and complexity), and that funding and management agents change 
depending upon the research category. 
 
Table 2. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Categories (DOD 7000.14-R) 
 
Depending upon the type or purpose of a research and development transaction, an 
appropriate “color of money” must be used to satisfy financial management regulations.  
Procurement funds are used for items the DoD wishes to have produced, or for items 
already developed and commercially available for purchase. 
It is also apparent in both the 5000 series and FAR/DFARS documents that 
acquisition procedures and governance vary according to dollar size of transactions.  The 
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Table 3.  Description and Decision Authority for ACAT I – III Programs  
(DODI 5000.2, May 2003) 
ACAT designated programs are further arrayed by application or functional area 
(currently Battlespace Awareness, Command & Control, Focused Logistics, Force 
Application, Force Protection, Joint Training, Net Centric warfare).  This is the “traditional” 
approach for the acquisition of items that are not yet mature enough for production nor 
commercially available.  
Contract purchase thresholds, along with associated degrees of governance, are 
also stratified in the DFARS.  For example, a “micro-purchase” is an acquisition of supplies 
or services, the aggregate amount of which does not exceed the micro-purchase threshold.  
That threshold varies somewhat according to the operational significance of the transaction: 
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the Davis-Bacon Act; and $25,000 for acquisitions of supplies or services contracted outside 
the United States in support of a contingency operation or catastrophic recovery.   
To minimize transaction costs for these relatively simple and straightforward, low-
dollar-value transactions, maximum use of the government purchase card (vice written 
purchase orders) is encouraged. Similarly, "Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT)" 
generally refers to transactions below $100,000, except for acquisitions of supplies or 
services that are to be used to support a contingency operation or catastrophic recovery, for 
which the amount is up to $250,000 for any contract to be awarded and performed, or 
purchase to be made, inside the United States; or $1,000,000 for any contract to be 
awarded and performed, or purchase to be made, outside the United States.   
Micro-purchase and simplified acquisition thresholds are important identifying 
characteristics of transactions used by the DoD that allow the use of simplified acquisition 
procedures in order to reduce transaction costs (the recognized administrative burden, and 
cost incurred in larger transactions).  Levels of decision move along this scale as well. 
Purchases of up to $5 million or even $10 million, depending upon circumstances, such as 
urgency or whether the item procured is “commercial,” can sometimes be made under such 
streamlined procedures (FAR Parts 2 and 13).26   
Competition as a governance mechanism (a powerful economic force for price 
reduction) is explicitly required for large purchases, both in statute and regulation. Although 
the possibility of ex-ante competition followed by ex-post lock-in and bi-lateral monopoly is 
somewhat overlooked.  
Some allowances are made for contracting officer discretion and determination.  For 
example, exceptions to the rule that permit contracting without providing for full and open 
competition are:  1) only one responsible source and no other supplies or service will satisfy 
agency requirements, 2) unusual and compelling urgency, 3) industrial mobilization; or 
engineering developmental, or research capability; or expert services, 4) international 
agreement, 5) authorized or required by statute, 6) national security, and 7) public interest 
(FAR 6.302).  Each of these statutory authorities must be fully supported, documented, and 
approved by the designated contract agency approval authority in the form of a Justification 
and Approval (J&A). Note the danger that many of these exceptions can subject DoD to a 
subsequent “holdup” resulting in higher costs, lower performance or schedule delays. 
Finally, with regard to the acquisition transaction feature of cost, a long-standing 
paradigm exists in the DoD with regard to system lifecycle costs.  As shown in Figure 2, 
phases of a notional program’s lifecycle correspond to budgetary appropriations and cost 
categories.  While the relative amounts shown in each category may not hold across every 
program or technical commodity, this model has been demonstrated often enough to be a 
widely accepted view of how costs are typically distributed. 
                                                
26 It is also within the FAR that socio-economic objectives are expressed as constraints upon transactions, such 
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Figure 2. Illustrative Program Lifecycle 
(Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Nov. 2004, p. 43) 
 
An interesting aspect of TCE can be introduced into the Lifecycle Production Cost 
graph illustrated in Figure 2. The first stage of the lifecycle is characterized by great 
uncertainty and complexity as the product is being developed. Our earlier discussion of TCE 
suggests transaction costs are likely to be high in this phase (especially as a fraction of the 
total dollar costs of this phase of the program) as these early transactions tend to be 
governed more by Cost Plus contracts. However, once the technology is well understood 
and the product clearly specified, uncertainty and complexity are reduced and transaction 
costs are likely to be a much smaller part of the Investment phase, where contracts are 
more likely to be governed by competition for fixed-price contracts. However, towards the 
end of that phase, asset specificity could lead to opportunistic renegotiation of the 
production contract if the company is in a position to “hold up” the government (say by 
significantly raising the cost of any change orders). Both production and transaction costs in 
the classic Lifecycle cost model illustrated in Figure 2 could end up being very helpful to 
Program Managers. 
We have already revealed a broad range of defense acquisition transactions with 
varying degrees of governance and administration requirements according to dollar size.  
But we can also point out that operational significance, specifically the implication of time 
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A recent initiative to accommodate joint urgent operational needs is codified in 
CJCSI 3470.01 (July 15, 2005).  It establishes policy and procedures to facilitate 
procurement of urgent, execution-year combatant commander needs outside of the DoD 
5000 series process, specifically for programs of ACAT II level or below. Generally, these 
are considered to be life- or combat mission-threatening needs, which were previously 
unforeseen and that are now required to be fulfilled within months versus years.  
While this new process is not intended to replace the JCIDS process of formal 
requirements development, it is meant to accelerate the fielding of readily available systems 
for wartime use.  Each of the services has a similar initiative for rapid response or 
accelerated deployment capability using COTS or Nondevelopmental Items (NDI).  One 
such example is the Army’s Warfighter Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP). It is a fund of 
approximately $100 million per year that the Army uses to rapidly procure relatively low-cost 
but high-leverage systems that performed well in experimentation. The WRAP effort has 
reportedly reduced acquisition cycle-time for systems procured by an average of 12 months. 
The Marine Corps and the Air Force∗ have established similar rapid acquisition programs in 
FY 2001 and FY 2002, respectively (ADR, 2000). 
In keeping with the aspect of timeliness as it relates to transaction procedures and 
governance, we have also noted above that commercial availability can serve as an 
important factor.  Likewise, within the realm of system development, technology maturity (or 
“readiness”) levels dictate the appropriate RDT&E funding categories to be employed, and 
determine whether progression into advanced development or production is warranted.   
Technology Readiness Levels (see Table 4 below) are measures used to assess the 
maturity of evolving technologies prior their incorporation into a system. This characteristic 
can be viewed as addressing both timeliness and customer quality-of-use or degree of 
technical performance.  Usually, when new technologies emerge, they are not suitable for 
immediate application. Both hardware and software typically go through a process of 
experimentation, refinement, and increasingly rigorous testing until they are considered 
mature enough to be applied by end-users in military applications.  The scale below is now 
used by the DoD to assess maturity before the Department commits to further investments 
in technology.  This paradigm correlates well to a scale of increasing certainty or declining 
uncertainty. For example, depending on a trade-off between urgency of the requirement and 
cost, it may be desirous for technology to be at a 6 or 7 rating on the scale before 
commencing an advanced development (system-level development and demonstration) 
program.   
                                                
∗ Air Force Instruction 10-602 defines their Quick Reaction Capability (QRC) procedures for “any system or 
equipment that will or must be deployed (dictated by mission requirements) in a period of time that does not 
allow for routine planning, budgeting, and procurement. Deployment may occur with less than a complete 
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Actual application of the technology in its final form and under mission 
conditions, such as those encountered in operational test and evaluation. 
In almost all cases, this is the end of the last "bug fixing" aspects of true 
system development. Examples include using the system under 
operational mission conditions. 
9. Actual system 'flight proven' through 
successful mission operations 
Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under 
expected conditions. In almost all cases, this TRL represents the end of 
true system development. Examples include developmental test and 
evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to determine if it 
meets design specifications. 
8. Actual system completed and 'flight 
qualified' through test and 
demonstration 
Prototype near or at planned operational system. Represents a major step 
up from TRL 6, requiring the demonstration of an actual system prototype 
in an operational environment, such as in an aircraft, vehicle or space. 
Examples include testing the prototype in a test bed aircraft. 
7. System prototype demonstration in a 
operational environment 
Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond the 
breadboard tested for TRL 5, is tested in a relevant environment. 
Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated readiness. 
Examples include testing a prototype in a high fidelity laboratory 
environment or in simulated operational environment. 
6. System/subsystem model or 
prototype demonstration in a relevant 
environment 
Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The 
basic technological components are integrated with reasonably realistic 
supporting elements so that the technology can be tested in a simulated 
environment. Examples include 'high fidelity' laboratory integration of 
components. 
5. Component and/or breadboard 
validation in relevant environment 
Basic technological components are integrated to establish that the pieces 
will work together. This is relatively "low fidelity" compared to the eventual 
system. Examples include integration of 'ad hoc' hardware in a laboratory. 
4. Component and/or breadboard 
validation in laboratory environment 
Active research and development is initiated. This includes analytical 
studies and laboratory studies to physically validate analytical predictions 
of separate elements of the technology. Examples include components 
that are not yet integrated or representative. 
3. Analytical and experimental critical 
function and/or characteristic proof of 
concept 
Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, practical 
applications can be invented. The application is speculative and there is no 
proof or detailed analysis to support the assumption. Examples are still 
limited to paper studies. 
2. Technology concept and/or 
application formulated 
Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research begins with to be 
translated into applied research and development. Example might include 
paper studies of a technology's basic properties. 
1. Basic principles observed and 
reported 
Description Technology Readiness Level 
Table 4. Technology Readiness Levels in the Department of Defense (DoD) 
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Technical complexity within a system can be thought of as moving along a 
graduated scale, from low to high.27 The integration of multiple technologies in various 
states of component maturity (uncertainty) could hinder the attainment of system availability 
or performance reliability until fully state-of-the-art (Simon, 1996). Another transaction 
approach to satisfying user needs in a timely fashion is through Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs), introduced in 1994 to enable rapid, cost-effective 
introduction of new capabilities.   
ACTDs seek to rapidly field near-term materiel solutions, generally within two to four 
years. ACTDs have three principal objectives: understanding the “in-the-field” military utility 
of a new technology’s application before committing to procurement, developing operational 
concepts to employ the best use of a new capability, and providing residual capabilities 
directly to the combatant forces as equipment by-products of the demonstration (positive 
spillovers or externalities). ACTDs are prioritized to respond to critical military needs as 
determined by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) with near-term solutions 
based on mature or nearly mature technologies.  If successful, ACTDs may transition into 
the more formal DoD 5000 acquisition process at the appropriate juncture as “non-traditional 
acquisition” (ADR, 2000). 
Several other non-traditional acquisition approaches to enhance timeliness, satisfy 
user needs, or reduce administrative burdens are worthy of mention here:   
Limited Production-Urgent is an Army-type classification allowing for limited numbers of 
items to be procured on an urgent basis without full classification as a standard type item.  
This could foreseeably provide capability prior to completion of all required testing, man-
rating, etc. for a normal materiel release by organizations representing end-users. (AR 71-
32, March 3, 1997, HQDA) 
In 1994, Congress authorized the use of Other Transactions (OT) for the development of 
weapon prototypes such as projects often undertaken by the Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (Technology Investment Agreements or TIAs).  Under 10 USC § 2371, the 
term refers to any transaction vehicle other than a procurement contract, grant or 
cooperative agreement.  Under such authority, the transactions need not comply with 
procurement laws and regulations such as the FAR/DFARS.  A principal objective of the 
legislation was to encourage a larger number of commercial firms to participate in 
developing defense systems, thus expanding the technology base and tapping into 
commercial technologies. 
Born from the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986, the commander of the US Special 
Operations Command has unique acquisition authorities vested by Title 10 United States 
Code, Section 167.  It provides for the development and acquisition of special operations 
forces peculiar equipment, the authority to exercise the functions of the head of agency 
(HOA), and the authority to execute funds (through the establishment of Major Force 
Program 11).  This separate authority and funding account places all aspects of 
                                                
27 And though these authors have found no similar rubric or strata, the classical systems theory description of 
“many parts and many interactions” is a useful construct, along with other system properties such as non-linear 
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requirements, acquisition, and resources in one organization for SOF-peculiar materiel. In 
FY05, the total MFP-11 budget was $6.6 billion, one-third of which was for acquisition-
related transactions. 
Thus far, we have briefly described a range of transactions within the wide realm of 
materiel acquisition—from small, inexpensive items that are commercially available to large, 
complex developmental systems that are still beyond the reach of technical maturity and 
purchase availability (where much contracting uncertainty lies).  We have also noted 
common and relative aspects of timeline availability, dollar size, and technical performance, 
and how such attributes impact the governance of those transactions.  
D) Government Contract Types and Risk 
The contracting officer’s primary concern is the overall price the Government 
will actually pay. The contracting officer’s objective is to negotiate a contract of a 
type and with a price providing the contractor the greatest incentive for efficient and 
economical performance. The negotiation of a contract type and a price are 
related and should be considered together with the issues of risk and 
uncertainty to the contractor and the Government. Therefore, the contracting 
officer should not become preoccupied with any single element and should balance 
the contract type, cost, and profit or fee negotiated to achieve a total result—a price 
that is fair and reasonable to both the Government and the contractor.  (FAR, Part 
15.405(b)) 
Among the key events in any government acquisition transaction is the contract 
award.  The DoD employs contracts as vehicles for the accomplishment of acquisition 
objectives.  The FAR (and DoD Risk Management literature) state that the three attributes 
we have been discussing here: cost, timeliness and technical performance/quality, are also 
the primary areas of risk in any transaction (FAR, Part 7.105(a)(7)).  The policy dictates that 
determination of contract type “should be closely related to the risks involved in timely, cost-
effective, and efficient performance” (FAR Part 15.404-4(d)). “Type” of contracts refers to the 
contract compensation arrangement for defense contractors.  And contract type selection is 
the principal method of allocating cost risk between the Government and the contractor. 
As discussed earlier, a variety of contract types are available to the DoD and its 
contractors to provide flexibility in acquiring the large variety and volume of supplies and 
services needed.  Selecting the best contract type and price is a matter for negotiation and 
requires the exercise of sound judgment by both parties, judgment that this study proposes 
can be sharpened through the application of Transaction Cost Economics.  Both parties 
seek to negotiate the most appropriate contract type for the kind of work to be performed in 
order to minimize spending and performance from the government’s perspective and to 
maximize profits from the contractor’s perspective. 
As seen in the FAR statement above, the government’s objective is to negotiate a 
contract type and price (or estimated cost and fee) that will result in reasonable contractor 
(profit) risk and provide the contractor with the greatest incentive for efficient and 
economical performance.  Contracting officers are directed to consider the complexity as 
well as commercial availability and urgency of their transactions (FAR Part 5.203(b)). The 
larger the scale or more technical complexity of the transaction, the greater the perceived 




= - 260 - 
=
=
As briefly introduced above in Section 2.I, contracts are typically grouped into two 
broad categories: cost-reimbursement contracts and fixed-price contracts (FAR, p. 16.1-1).  
In cost-reimbursement type contracts, the government assumes more of the risk.  These 
contracts are suitable for use in research and development efforts “when uncertainties 
involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy 
to use any type of fixed-price contracts” (FAR, p. 16.3-1). Such contracts epitomize the 
conditions of incomplete contracting described earlier, where there is significant uncertainty 
(and/or complexity) that impacts both sides of the transaction.  
Cost-reimbursement type contracts include: cost-contracts, cost-sharing contracts, 
cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts, cost-plus-award fee contracts, and cost-plus-fixed-fee 
contracts, and place the burden of risk upon the government.  The government is willing to 
accept the risk of a cost-reimbursement type contract in order to motivate contractors to 
participate in the transaction, encourage them to propose solutions, and to provide products 
for which there is often a limited market.  In these cases, the government will attempt to tie 
the contractor’s profit to his performance, often based upon cost, schedule or technical 
performance parameters. 
Conversely, fixed-price contracts are usually used for production (for commercially 
available products, or after completion of system development) or paper studies (prior to 
advanced development) when the overall risk is “minimal or can be predicted with an 
acceptable degree of certainty” (FAR, p. 16.1-1).  Complete contracting conditions exist in 
instances where there is limited uncertainty and complexity.  
Fixed-price contract types include: firm-fixed-price contracts, fixed-price contracts 
with economic price adjustment, fixed-price incentive contracts, fixed-price contracts with 
prospective price redetermination, fixed-ceiling-price contracts with retroactive price 
redetermination, and firm-fixed-price level of effort contracts.  All of these enable the 
government to negotiate a payment for the desired effort with the additional capability, in 
some instances, to adjust for changes in the economy, or level of work produced. The risk is 
placed on the contractor because the government’s price is fixed regardless of the costs 
incurred by the contractor.  However, the further assumption is that these “best utilize the 
basic profit motive of business” by allowing the contractor to profit based on whatever 
savings he can generate. Again, while ex-ante competitive bidding for a fixed-price type 
contract may reveal the best price to the government, the possibility of asset specificity 
leading ex-post to a holdup (for instance, a renegotiation of the price) does not appear to be 
explicitly addressed. 
 A graphic representation of risk and contract types is shown below in Figure 3.  (See 
Appendix B for a Comparison of Major Contract Types for stratification of contract types, 
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Figure 3.  Continuum of Contract Risk and Type 
 
 
There are two primary methods of awarding contracts, as mentioned earlier in 
Section 2.  The sealed bidding method is the simplest and is used for smaller, less complex 
transactions—normally fixed-price (via IFB).  The contract is awarded after a review and 
evaluation of bids determined as “the responsible bidder whose bid, conforming to the 
invitation for bids, will be most advantageous to the Government, considering only price and 
the price-related factors included in the invitation” (FAR, p. 14.1-1). This is essentially an 
attempt to minimize transaction costs in the case where there is little uncertainty or 
complexity or asset specificity involved in the transaction (as proxied by relatively low dollar 
values).  
The other method of awarding contracts is by negotiation (via RFP).  This process is 
significantly more complex—to award and administer—requiring proposals, information and 
sometimes demonstration of technologies before the final contract is awarded.  Table 5 
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Table 5.  Typical Contract Type by Phase (DAU, 2004) 
CR TD SDD/SI SDD/SD PROD 
CPFF, FFP CPFF, FFP CPFF, CPIF CPIF, CPAF FPI(F), FFP 
 
E) Transaction Attributes Affect Acquisition Governance 
The limited scope of this research study can hardly do justice to the vast arena of 
contract management by our mere mention of contract types according to risk, etc.  Our 
purpose is to simply emphasize that defense acquisition transactions are multi-faceted with 
multiple variants, but primarily focus on aspects of cost, schedule and technical performance as 
success measures, governance determinants, and influences on the contracting vehicle.  Other 
factors that have an important bearing on acquisition transactions include economic factors 
such as whether or not the supplier base is highly competitive; whether or not requirements are 
fully known (the degree of uncertainty); the materiel mission environment, etc. However, our 
observations of the many types of transactions for acquiring materiel and the range of contract 
vehicles employed exhibit a somewhat linear incorporation of governance along the growth lines 
of cost, schedule and technical performance risks, as in Figure 4 below.  Perhaps the most 
important conclusion to draw from this discussion is that the TCE characteristic of asset 
specificity does not appear to have been captured as a key concern of acquisition transactions 
in the traditional applied literature or in defense and other federal acquisition policy documents; 
although, we have found practices that (at least indirectly) address this important characteristic 
of economic behavior.   
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F) The Cost of Acquisition Transactions 
While much attention in defense acquisition is placed upon what is spent on contracts or 
in budgetary categories as production costs, less emphasis seems to fall upon the costs of the 
transactions themselves. However, Congress has focused upon the size of the acquisition 
workforce, presumably as a driver of administrative costs associated with acquisition. Congress 
passed legislation throughout the 1990’s aimed at significant reductions in the acquisition 
workforce over a span of 5-10 years (CSRS Acq Reform Issues, 2002). 
For example, the Defense Contract Management Agency (prior to the March 2000 
Defense Contract Management Command) had reduced its size from approximately 24,000 
contract administration services personnel in 1990 to approximately 11,000 personnel in 2001. 
In 2000, it was estimated that of $91 billion dollars of unliquidated obligations on defense 
contracts were being administered under the purview of the Defense Contract Management 
Agency. Upwards of 25% of the transactions were for “small dollar contracts”—purchase orders 
valued under $2,500—with an approximate administration cost of $300 each.  As Eiband 
suggests, “procurement complexity, lead time, and administrative costs all increase as one 
ascends the hierarchy” (Eiband, ARJ).  Similar oversight or administrative services are also 
performed by agencies such as the Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Defense Finance 
and Accounting Service, who audit and pay contractors respectively. 
G) Acquisition Practices   
Described below are other areas where the DoD has attempted to address transactions 
costs, though perhaps not using TCE terminology.  The business of defense materiel acquisition 
has gone through a number of reform cycles, with particular emphasis on adoption of best 
practices and approaches to constrain cost, improve cycle-time, improve discipline.  Such 
initiatives include using electronic commerce to reduce paperwork and its associated costs, use 
of commercial standards and processes, off-the-shelf components, and best business practices.  
Others include using performance (versus technical) specifications and contracting techniques 
for sharing of cost savings with contractors, such as Value Engineering Change 
Proposals. Rand cited a total of sixty-three such initiatives in their recent report on the status of 
reforms undertaken in the 1990s.  Some of the most widely accepted are described below, each 
involving a strategic shift in the relationship between government buyers and private industry 
sellers. Interestingly, each example is associated with some aspect of economic behavior 
emphasized in the TCE literature. 
1. Multi-year Contracting and Frequency 
Motivating and incentivizing industry partners in DoD acquisition typically focuses on 
ensuring competition through the use of multiple sources, component breakout, leader/follower 
development and production, dual source of critical components, etc. The DoD assumes that a 
competitive business environment exists, and indeed is compelled under the Competition in 
Contracting Act of 1984, as amended, to acquire supplies and services through the use of full 
and open competition.  However, as indicated above, sole source procurements can be justified; 
and in that environment, cost savings might still be attained through the use of a variety of 
business initiatives such as value engineering, multiyear procurements and other types of 




= - 264 - 
=
=
Multi-year contracting is seen by many to provide a more stable and longer-term 
relationship between the government buyer and industry supplier, versus the more typical 
annual commitments from congressional appropriations and authorizations. The TCE 
characteristic of frequency emerges in multi-year contracting, whereby the government commits 
to purchase of goods or services beyond a single year (retaining its unilateral right to terminate 
for convenience). If it is credible, this limited commitment on the part of government can afford 
contractors the perceived stability needed to motivate investments in capital improvements. The 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 encourages longer-term supplier relationships. But 
multi-year contracts must still demonstrate significant advantage in pricing over annual contracts 
and may not extend for more than a five-year period. Full funding need not necessarily be in 
place for the total duration of the buy, but termination/cancellation charges apply if the contract 
has to be cancelled or is not funded in accord with the programmed buy (Rand, 2005). 
2. Integrated Product and Process Development and Asset Ownership 
Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) was instituted to save costs by 
ensuring a "systems" approach to acquisition. IPPD helps prevent additions and/or changes late 
in the lifecycle for factors "forgotten" earlier, such as supportability, testability, and producibility. 
The idea was not new, and grew out of systems management thinking which was became 
prevalent in the 1970s.  A primary tenet of IPPD is to recognize the multi-disciplined nature of 
complex projects, like weapon system development, incorporate a cross-functional methodology 
to planning and analysis of requirements at the front end of systems development.  Absolute 
necessity for both early problem discovery and buy-in of all participants at all levels—if and only 
if—well led.  Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) are the means through which IPPD is 
implemented.  IPTs are cross-functional teams that are formed for the specific purpose of 
delivering a product for the customer. IPT members should have complementary skills and be 
committed to a common purpose. DoD zealously implemented the IPPD philosophy with four 
formal levels of hierarchical IPTs—from project-level working groups to over-arching OSD-level 
“teams.”  Key in the IPT concept is the idea that a multiple perspective view of a problem early 
on may go a great ways toward advanced problem discovery and total realization of 
requirements across areas like designing, testing, supporting and maintaining, improving, 
manufacturing, packaging, etc. Changes in the design of a system early on prevent much 
costlier changes later.28   
3. Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV)—Heightened Awareness/Shared Risk 
Another one of several recent initiatives aimed at controlling costs in the DoD is cost as 
an independent variable (CAIV), where a system’s ultimate objectives of performance are re-
examined as costs increase greatly relative to performance gains. The CAIV philosophy means 
that cost will be treated as a constraint or fixed variable, much like a fixed budget, among the 
three variables (cost, schedule and performance).  In past endeavors, performance was seen as 
the paramount objective and was the more programmatically stable variable.  Cost and 
                                                
28 IPT/IPPD is now a core tenet embodying the belief that a breadth and diversity of perspectives is a problem-solving 
strength, and operationalizing systems-theory principles such as Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, replacing 
traditionally adversarial relationships among key players (users, acquirers, testers, funds managers, contractors, and 
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schedule increased as needed to deliver the desired capability.  Under the CAIV philosophy, 
stronger consideration is to be given for fixing the costs of system development programs.  
Program managers are now required to establish realistic objectives for their programs early on 
and trade off performance and schedule continually to achieve a balanced set of goals that 
achieve cost objectives.  The policy accompanies evolutionary acquisition as a means of 
delaying full performance delivery, if necessary. 
Implementation of the philosophy could be extended to contracting strategy, whereby the 
contractor might be required to address cost targets derived from CAIV estimates in his 
proposal and later be rewarded with specific incentives for their attainment.  Incentives for 
government program managers to use CAIV to trade off excessive performance requirements of 
a system are that funds might perhaps be better applied toward the most achievable 
parameters, and ultimate cancellation of the program may be avoided. Contractors involved 
would foreseeably share these aims as well as continued profit motivation from viable business 
programs (Rand, 2005). 
4. Alpha Contracting for ex-ante Discovery 
Alpha contracting is all about ex-ante discovery about the contract terms within 
incomplete contracting, to encourage mutual compliance ex-post. The government and industry 
partnership is central in the military acquisition domain—with both parties pursuing both 
common and separate goals based upon their buyer and seller roles.  The government’s 
traditional contracting approach (before acquisition reforms of the last decade) required 
successive iterations between the client and the supplier—to discover the client’s requirements 
and the applicable supplier technologies—until a relatively complete contract could be written.  
In Alpha Contracting, this traditional sequential interdependency relationship has changed to a 
closer reciprocal interdependency relationship, a more symmetrical one, in which the client and 
supplier work together to define the requirements and discover solutions.  Again, the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation gives guidelines for this dialogue: 
The Government must not hesitate to communicate with the commercial sector 
as early as possible in the acquisition cycle to help the Government determine 
the capabilities available in the commercial marketplace. The Government will 
maximize its use of commercial products and services in meeting Government 
requirements. (FAR, Part 1.102-2) 
Alpha Contracting has evolved from a 1990s-era reform initiative aimed at improving 
government and contractor communications in order to increase efficiency and effectiveness.  
At its very foundation is a need for increased trust and teaming toward common 
government/industry objectives, within the paradigm of their buyer/seller relationship.  By 
encouraging more collaboration early in the contracting negotiations phase, Alpha Contracting 
reduces procurement costs and cycle-time via joint and concurrent processes and information 
flows.  Key activities in the process are: specification of requirements, preparation of the 
statement of work, negotiations and executive review. Cumulatively, these activities reduce 
uncertainty and complexity, allowing for writing a more complete contract and, thereby, reducing 
transaction costs. 
Even though direct savings may be hard to quantify, most agree the savings derived 
from Alpha Contracting are substantial, even if the only savings counted is the increase in the 
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explained, the indirect benefits extend to both government and contractor as monitoring costs of 
other agencies like Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and Defense Contract Management 
Agency (DCMA) are precluded.  This initiative actually seeks and obtains the information that 
enables a trust-based partnership. The shift from sequential to concurrent requirements 
definition and design is happening in many industries, not only DoD acquisition.  For example, 
the construction industry has adopted the design/build approach.   
In addition to collaborating on the requirements definition and contracting phase of new 
product development, the interpersonal closeness developed in the Alpha Contracting approach 
can be carried over to the development stage.  The use of Integrated Product Teams (IPT) 
encourages the government’s user representatives and the contracting supplier’s engineers to 
work together as the new product is designed and the initial prototypes are built. In some 
instances, the government’s representatives and the contractor’s engineers are co-located in 
the same building.  The potential advantages of this increasingly close interdependency 
between client and supplier are to shorten the design process, reduce development costs and, 
hopefully, to increase the quality of the resulting product.  These advantages mainly apply to the 
government, but the advantage to the contractor in such closer interaction might be a perceived 
as generating a reputation that increases its likelihood of winning a future competitive bid. The 
potential disadvantages of this trend towards more concurrent engineering include the 
difficulties of achieving higher interdependencies between everyone involved in the project, 
including the government representatives and the contractor’s engineers, designers and 
developers (Dillard & Zolin, 2005). 
5. Evolutionary Acquisition Addresses Uncertainty Incrementally 
A series of influential GAO reports on defense acquisition from 1996 through 2002 
concluded that the DoD had repeatedly spent more time and money than originally planned on 
weapon systems, and urged that the Department: 
Carefully assess technology (GAO 02-39 2001) and separate its research and 
development from its more advanced product development (i.e., mature the candidate 
technologies before commitment to advanced development) (GAO NSIAD-99-162, 1999). 
Move to a “knowledge-based” approach, to learn more about a design’s capability to 
satisfy requirements and a prototype’s ability to be manufactured, earlier in the process (GAO 
02-701, 2002). 
Change the incentive environment to allow PMs to identify unknowns as high risks 
without suffering criticism and loss of support (GAO NSIAD-98-56, 1998). 
An approach to mitigate these technological challenges, which are all related to 
uncertainty and complexity, is evolutionary acquisition, referred to by some outside of DoD as 
progressive acquisition.  Also advocated by the General Accountability Office, it has evolved 
worldwide as a concept over the past two decades.   
Evolutionary acquisition is an incremental development approach, using iterative 
development cycles versus a single grand design.  DoD’s adaptation of this approach is a major 
policy thrust in the series, and is the stated “preferred approach” toward all new system 
developments.  This particular policy thrust is important as it offers an incremental approach to 
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increments, thus having an impact on the amount of monitoring and controlling to be performed 
during system development.29   
6. Single Process Initiative Uses Frequency and Specialization 
The Single Process Initiative was another coordinated idea among DoD and industry 
partners to allow contractors to use a single process for manufacturing both commercial and 
military products within their facilities, and to have common management and reporting on all 
defense contracts, versus multiplicity of same across separate contracts. Similar efforts through 
the 1990s were aimed at reducing DoD peculiar requirements seen as “bureaucratic.”  They are: 
use of performance (“what to”) versus military (“how to”) specifications, and even such 
application to service contracts, elimination of non-value-added packaging and reporting 
requirements, and elimination of detailed cost and pricing data for procurements under 
$550,000 thresholds (Rand, 2005). 
7. Reputation and the Use of Past Performance Data and Award for Best Value 
Reputation has been shown to be an important enforcement mechanism to reduce ex-
post opportunistic behavior, and is operationalized under this initiative.  It incorporates individual 
contractor “Past Performance Data” for competitive contract award decisions and makes such 
information a key factor in the source-selection process. The concept is to further motivate 
positive cost schedule and performance outcomes across multiple DoD contracts by 
heightening performance visibility and requiring its evaluation and consideration.  In a similar 
vein, the initiative of “Best-value Contracting” has also emerged, meaning that contracts can 
and should be awarded on the basis of “best value” (i.e., of cost, schedule and technical 
performance) rather than simply accepting the lowest bid.  This was designed to simplify 
performance evaluation criteria, and to allow more flexibility for innovations to meet program 
objectives (Rand, 2005).  
SECTION 4: SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A) TCE AND PUBLIC SECTOR OUTSOURCING 
Transactions costs are not the only consideration for make-or-buy decisions. If that were 
so, then one might conclude the government should generally insource production of complex 
weapon systems and outsource janitorial services. For good reasons, the opposite is the more 
typical practice.30 In evaluating transactions for their “make-or-buy?” decisions, firms typically 
consider both production costs and the cost of managing transactions (transaction costs). 
The goal of this paper was to integrate and apply key principles of TCE (that previously 
focused on the firm) to government outsourcing. TCE recognizes organizations enter into 
bilateral contracts with suppliers, workers, managers, customers, firms, and other organizations 
that require costly governance (coordination and incentive) mechanisms.  
                                                
29 These activities, while important in addressing uncertainty, are substantially increased under evolutionary 
acquisition (Dillard, 2003). 
 30 However, advocates of the arsenal system could argue (and have) that the hazards illuminated by TCE indicate 
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It is time for government to do the same. The process for outsourcing determinations 
should have both credibility and precision. “Credibility” means, among other things, that the right 
competitions are held with rules assuring both products and services are adequately provided 
regardless of the winning proposal.  “Precision” means established guidelines usually ensure 
the services in question are indeed provided at least cost to the public. 
The implications of this discussion involve precision. In the case of outsourcing a 
transaction where complexity, uncertainty and asset specificity can lead to renegotiation, the 
choice of governance structure drives productive effort and unproductive bargaining. Ideally, 
contracts can be written that specify measures of performance, conflict resolution procedures, 
and conditions under which the contract can be modified, as well as provisions for sharing gains 
from transaction-specific investments. In reality, the tradeoff as it applies to outsourcing might 
be stated as follows. On the one hand, efforts to suppress opportunism contractually are limited 
by the costs of writing and enforcing contractual agreements, and rise with the complexity, 
uncertainty, and asset specificity associated with the transaction. This works against 
outsourcing. On the other hand, while integration within the organization mitigates these 
problems, internal principal-agent issues arise that sacrifice the high-powered incentives of the 
market and consequently require greater monitoring and administrative costs. This works in 
favor of outsourcing.  
In summary, like private firms, government “make-or-buy?” decisions should look 
beyond production cost savings and forecast likely transaction costs associated with 
outsourcing. Moreover, government rules that prescribe particular contract types should be 
based on the four principal characteristics of transactions, and should offer contracts and 
mechanisms that encourage productive effort, protect transaction-specific investments, and 
discourage unproductive bargaining, influence and rent-seeking activities. The conventional 
wisdom in the transaction costs literature is that the decision to outsource should not be taken 
lightly.  While the potential production-cost savings may well be tempting, there are associated 
costs and risks, albeit less obvious.  They are less important (and might be negligible) for 
simple, one-time transactions where alternate suppliers are readily available.  Yet, they can be 
critically important when the outsourcing arrangement is such that there is only one supplier 
readily available in a complex and lengthy relationship. Hence, the decision to outsource must 
weigh production cost savings against the costs and risks associated with a critical source of 
supply being outside the firm’s control.  Those are generally referred to as the transaction costs 
of the outsourcing relationship.  Thus, outsourcing is preferred only if the total costs are less 
than the costs of production with the firm’s (in-house, organic) assets.  That is, a firm should 
outsource only if the following is true:  
Cost of in-house production + Agency Costs > Outsourcing + Transaction Costs. 
B. IMPLICATIONS OF THIS SYNTHESIS 
Comparing the two bodies of knowledge (TCE theory with DoD acquisition practice) 
leads to some interesting insights.  There are two basic questions to consider.  First, what does 
TCE tell us about improving DoD acquisition practices?  And second, what does the body of 
practice in DoD acquisition management indicate for new research in TCE?  Since our audience 
for this effort is DoD acquisition managers, we focus primarily on that first question—and 
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First, even though originally intended to study the make-or-buy decision, TCE offers 
useful insights for Program Managers strictly involved with the “buy” option.  TCE highlights 
problems that can, and do, arise in outsourcing relationships, and provides useful indicators 
regarding their severity (i.e., the expected “transactions costs”).  While the main body of TCE 
casts light on make-or-buy (vertical integration) issues, it also provides powerful insights into the 
effective management of outsourcing relationships. 
Second, acquisition managers are not engaged in a game against nature.  Current 
acquisition practices emphasize (properly) the management of risk.  However, managing the 
relationship with industrial partners (contractors) is also very important.  Program Managers 
need to anticipate issues that pertain to governing outsourcing relationships with the same 
vigilance with which they anticipate risks—with a view to managing and mitigating both sets of 
problems. 
There is an inherent conflict between DoD and its contractors. The two have different 
objectives. DoD wants “better, faster, cheaper.” Contractors need to be profitable to survive. 
The key is for Program Managers to understand and anticipate the parties’ divergent interests 
and to be prepared to deal with difficulties that might arise.  Such situations are usually better 
addressed through anticipatory measures—such as well-crafted contracts which include 
appropriate incentives to align the interests of the two parties and encourage constructive 
behavior and provisions for governance of the relationship (especially ways to settle disputes).  
Third, there is no universal solution to managing these relationships.  Every outsourcing 
transaction involves a number of characteristics that can materially influence the nature of the 
relationship. TCE helps anticipate opportunistic behavior that can jeopardize the DoD-contractor 
partnership.  While asset specificity is certainly a major cause of conflict for outsourcing 
relationships, there are a number of other possible causes.  At minimum, Program Managers 
should assess contractual relationships using something like the stoplight method introduced in 
Appendix B to help anticipate, and prepare for, these difficulties. 
Finally, DoD contracting practice would be greatly enriched by viewing defense 
transactions through the lens of TCE.  An important insight is the opportunity to craft contracts 
based on the potential for opportunistic behavior, in addition to varying incentives based on 
shifting risk.  Where there is significant scope for opportunistic behavior, contracts should pay 
special attention to the use of additional mechanisms to govern the outsourcing relationship.  
This suggests that existing guidance on contract types should be extensively revisited—an 
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APPENDIX A. A TCE BARGAINING GAME MODEL 
 
A game is developed between two parties in a transaction (i=1,2) whose combined 




αα eAeS = ; where the standard Cobb-Douglas assumptions are satisfied. 
In the case of government outsourcing, the two parties could be an internal government 
customer and external private contractor.31 Each player can also engage in unproductive 
bargaining, bi. This influence and rent-seeking activity consists of measures and counter-
measures designed to preserve, capture or extract a larger share of the surplus. While effort 
expands S for both parties in the transaction, bargaining determines the share each player 
realizes. The combined costs of engaging in productive and unproductive activities (to generate 
and capture the surplus respectively) are assumed to dilute the share of surplus enjoyed by 
each player.  
Player 1 chooses productive effort, e1, and unproductive bargaining, b1, to maximize his 
utility function: 




1121 βγσσ +−−+ ; 
Similarly, player 2 chooses e2 and b2 to maximize her utility function: 




2212 βγσσ +−−+ . 
The first two terms in brackets in (2a,b) represent the net benefit to each player derived 
from bargaining over his share of the surplus, S. The last term represents the quadratic costs to 
each player of engaging in unproductive bargaining activities and productive efforts 
(respectively), as a share of S.  
From (1), the parameter associated with the marginal benefit of effort (for each player 
i=1,2) is iα . From (2a,b), the parameter associated with the marginal cost of effort is iβ . 
Meanwhile, the parameter associated with the marginal cost of bargaining is iγ . Under the 
simplifying assumption the marginal benefit of bargaining is the same for both players, or σ , the 
first order conditions (four equations derived from maximizing 2a with respect to e1 and b1, and 
2b with respect to e2 and b2) can be solved independently for the optimal bargaining activity of 
each player: 
                                                
31 For instance, consider a government customer (or principal) that actively revises rules and regulations to allow 
more economical or flexible procurement on the part of a private contractor (or agent). This productive effort could 
lower the agent’s input costs, thereby contributing to joint savings or a surplus. Meanwhile, suppose the agent 
simultaneously engages in productive investments in human capital or new processes that further contribute to the 
surplus. “By exerting effort the [agent] can hold down its realized costs. For example, it can, at some cost to itself, 
search for lower-priced raw materials…or it can manage its…inventories so that it is not left holding excessive stocks” 
(McAfee & McMillan, 1988, p.17). The challenge remains how any gains, savings or surpluses are shared between 
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* σσ eeAS = . 
Finally, substituting (3a,b), (4a,b) and (1’) into (2a,b) yields the utility each player 
achieves as a result of the joint decisions of the two parties to the transaction: (2a’) 
*




A reasonable simplifying assumption is that the marginal cost of bargaining is the same 
for both parties in the transaction, or that γγγ == 21 . From (3a,b), this implies symmetric 




1 bbb == . The 
comparative static results from the model appear in Table A1 below.32  
TABLE A1. Comparative Static Results 
e1 e2 b S
+ 0 0 +
0 + 0 +
- 0 0 -
0 - 0 -
 - - + -














                                                
32 Relaxing the simplifying assumptions that the marginal benefit and costs of bargaining are the same for both 
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In general, the less complex and uncertain a transaction, the lower the degree of asset 
specificity, and the greater the frequency, then the lower β  and σ , and the higher γ . From 
Table 3, at the optimum, reducing β  increases productive effort, ei, and the surplus, or gains 
from exchange, S. Also from Table 3, reducing σ  and increasing γ  lowers unproductive 
bargaining, b, and boosts productive efforts, ei, and, consequently, the surplus, S. The higher 
the combined effort (e) and joint surplus (S), the greater the potential returns from 
outsourcing.33 
APPENDIX B. AN OUTSOURCING RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD 
A thesis by Powell proposes a method for defense managers to assess the risks 
associated with a proposed outsourcing action.34  Basically, aspects of the new relationship are 
related with a stoplight scheme.  For example, if there is a high degree of asset specificity 
involved, there would be a red light in that category, and a higher degree of risk is indicated.  
Powell intended the light scheme to increase visibility of areas where management attention is 
important, and where managers ought to focus their risk-reduction efforts. 
That application is certainly valid, but there’s another wrinkle.  The study of Transaction 
Cost Economics indicates that risk-reduction measures (even if highly effective) are not risk-
elimination panaceas.  Accordingly, one can expect an overall outsourcing action with a large 
number of assessed red and yellow lights will be more costly and risky during its execution, 
even with due diligence in risk reduction. 
What follows is a variation of Powell’s stoplight scheme.35 
a. Asset Specificity. 
RED. Source becomes specialized, with no close substitutes or competitors readily 
available. Example: only qualified supplier for a specific, highly-specialized task—such 
as suppliers of spare parts for aging weapon systems. High barriers to entry. 
GREEN. Routine (non-specialized) goods or tasks; competitors or close substitutes 
readily available. Example: purchase of standard commercial items, such as paper clips 
and other office supplies. Low barriers to entry.  
b. Complexity. 
RED. A large-scale task covering a large geographic area. Complexity of task severely 
limits qualified bidders. Example: large-scale, complex IT support; such as NMCI. 
GREEN. A simple, routine task or standard product. A large number of qualified bidders. 
Example: office supplies and dental services. (Even though dentistry is a complex 
                                                
33 The lower sigma (the marginal benefit of unproductive bargaining) and the higher gamma (the marginal cost of 
unproductive bargaining) for any particular activity, the lower the transaction costs of outsourcing. 
34 Powell, 2002. 
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activity requiring considerable skill and training, dental services are available throughout 
the general economy; that is, substitutes for contractor services are readily available.) 
c. Length of Relationship.36 
RED. A long-term relationship, which strains ability to foresee problems during original 
contract negotiations. Complexity and asset specificity exacerbate this problem. 
Example: IT support, such as NMCI. 
GREEN. Outsourcing is a one-time transaction, or can be structured as a series of one-
time transactions. Example: purchase of office supplies. 
d. Frequency. 
RED. Specialized, complex task or service from which there is significant learning-by-
doing.  Incumbent contractor has significant competitive advantage over potential 
competitors. Example: contract maintenance for specialized aircraft, such as E-4s. 
GREEN. Routine, standard task, service or product, in which a number of firms have 
significant expertise. Example: copy machine repair. 
e. Time Sensitivity. (added) 
RED. Quick performance of task or delivery of product is essential for satisfactory 
performance. Example: repair of combat aircraft, or warship subsystems. 
GREEN. Quick delivery of products or accomplishment of task is not essential for 
satisfactory performance. Satisfactory performance can include some delays.  Example: 
copy machine repairs. 
f. Operational Significance. (added) 
RED. Unsatisfactory performance significantly degrades operational capability or 
compromises safety. Example: repair of combat aircraft or warship subsystems. 
GREEN. Unsatisfactory performance involves, at most, administrative inconvenience 
and longer time to accomplish routine tasks.  No compromise of operational readiness or 
safety.  Examples: delays in copy machine repairs and temporary lack of office supplies. 
APPENDIX C.  RULES FOR CONTRACT TYPES 
Comparison of Major Contract Types (Fixed Price) 
 Firm Fixed-price (FFP) Fixed-price Economic 
Price Adjustment 
Fixed-price Incentive 
Firm Fixed-price Award-fee  
Fixed-price 
Prospective 
                                                
36 In a sense, the relationship lasts as long as the period specified in the contract, which means length of relationship 
issues can certainly be addressed in contracts.  However, contracts must be agreed to by both parties, and the 
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(FPEPA) (FPIF) (FPAF) Redetermination 
(FPRP) 
Principal Risk to be 
Mitigated 
None. Thus, the 
contractor assumes all 
cost risk. 
Unstable market prices 
for labor or material 
over the life of the 
contract. 
Moderately uncertain 
contract labor or 
material 
requirements.  
Risk that the user will 
not be fully satisfied 




the first year 
because they 
cannot be estimated 
with  
confidence.  
Use When… The requirement is 
well-defined.  
Contractors are 
experienced in meeting 
it.  
Market conditions are 
stable.  
Financial risks are 
otherwise insignificant.  
The market prices at 
risk are severable and 





The dollars at risk 
outweigh the 
administrative burdens 
of an FPEPA. 
A ceiling price can be 
established that 
covers the most 
probable risks 
inherent in the nature 
of the work. The 
proposed profit 
sharing formula 
would motivate the 
contractor to control 
costs and meet other 
objectives. 
Judgmental standards 
can be fairly applied by 
an Award-fee panel. 
The potential fee is 
large enough to both: 
Provide a meaningful 




needs a firm 
commitment from 
the contractor to 
deliver the supplies 
or services during 
subsequent years. 
The dollars at risk 
outweigh the 
administrative 
burdens of an 
FPRP. 
Elements A firm fixed-price for 
each line item or one 
or more groupings of 
line items. 
A fixed-price, ceiling on 
upward  
adjustment, and a 
formula for adjusting 
the price up or down 
based on: 
Established prices.  
Actual labor or material 
costs.  
Labor or material 
indices.  
A ceiling price  
Target cost  







A firm fixed-price.  
Standards for evaluating 
performance.  
Procedures for 
calculating a fee based 
on performance against 
the standards.  
Fixed-price for the 
first period.  
Proposed 
subsequent periods 
(at least 12 months 
apart).  
Timetable for pricing 
the next period(s).  
Contractor is 
Obliged to: 
Provide an acceptable 
deliverable at the time, 
place and price 
specified in the 
contract. 
Provide an acceptable 
deliverable at the time 
and place specified in 




deliverable at the 
time and place 
specified in the 
contract at or below 
the ceiling price. 
Perform at the time, 
place, and the price 
fixed in the contract. 
Provide acceptable 
deliverables at the 
time and place 
specified in the 
contract at the price 






Generally realizes an 
additional dollar of 
profit for every dollar 
that costs are reduced. 
Generally realizes an 
additional dollar of 
profit for every dollar 
that costs are reduced.
Realizes a higher 
profit by completing 
the work below the 
ceiling price and/or by 
meeting objective 
performance targets. 
Generally realizes an 
additional dollar of profit 
for every dollar that 
costs are reduced; 
earns an additional fee 
for satisfying the 
performance standards. 
For the period of 
performance, 
realizes an 
additional dollar of 
profit for every dollar 
that costs are 
reduced. 
Typical Application Commercial supplies 
and services. 
Long-term contracts for 
commercial supplies 
during a period of high 
inflation 
Production of a major 





production of spare 
parts for a major 
system. 
Principal 
Limitations in FAR 
Generally NOT Must be justified. Must be justified. 
Must be negotiated. 
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Parts 16, 32, 35, 
and 52 
appropriate for R&D. Contractor must have 
an adequate  
accounting system. 
Cost data must 
support targets. 
Contractor must 
have an adequate 
accounting system 




Variants Firm Fixed-price Level 
of Effort. 















Cost or  
Cost- Sharing 
(C or CS) 
 
Time & Materials (T&M)
Principal Risk to 
be Mitigated 
Highly uncertain and speculative labor hours, labor mix, and/or material requirements (and 
other things) necessary to perform the contract. The Government assumes the risks 
inherent in the contract -benefiting if the actual cost is lower than the expected cost-losing if 
the work cannot be completed within the expected cost of performance.  
Use When… An objective 
relationship can be 
established 
















standards can be 
fairly applied.1 
Potential fee 
























the vendor is 
a non-profit 
entity.  
No other type of 
contract is suitable (e.g., 
because costs are too 
low to justify an audit of 
the contractor's indirect 
expenses). 
Elements Target cost  
Performance 
targets (optional)  
A minimum, 
maximum, and 
target fee  
A formula for 
adjusting fee 
based on actual 
costs and/or 
performance.  




A base and 







Target cost  
Fixed fee  
Target cost  




share of the 
cost.  
No fee  
A ceiling price  
A per-hour labor rate 
that also covers 
overhead and profit  
Provisions for 
reimbursing direct 









Make a good faith effort to meet the Government's needs within 
the estimated cost in the Schedule. 
Make a good faith effort 
to meet the 
Government's needs 





Realizes a higher 
fee by completing 
the work at a lower 





Realizes a higher 









total cost) as 
total cost 
decreases. 
If CS, shares 




















Emergency repairs to 




FAR Parts 16, 32, 
35, and 52 
The contractor must have an adequate accounting system. The 
Government must exercise surveillance during performance to 
ensure use of efficient methods and cost controls. Must be 
negotiated. Must be justified. Statutory and regulatory limits on 
the fees that may be negotiated. Must include the applicable 
Limitation of Cost clause at FAR 52.232-20 through 23. 
Labor rates must be 




surveillance to ensure 
efficient performance. 
Variants     Completion 
or Term. 
  Labor Hour (LH) 
1 Goodwill is the value of the name, reputation, location, and intangible assets of the firm 
Adapted from Contract Pricing Reference Guides (Vol. 4). Advanced issues in contract 
pricing matching contract type to contract risk. Retrieved from 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/contractpricing/vol4chap1.htm 
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